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I. INTRODUCTION 
One hundred years ago the United States experienced the industrial 
revolution. The early industrialists expanded their plant capacity as 
far as they physically could and then engaged in cut-throat practices 
with their competitors. Most economic battles were so·lved by combina-
tion arrangements in the form of the now infamous trust. These trusts 
abused all segments of the business community as well as the gene~al 
public. Trusts soon were both feared and hated by most Americans. con-
gress responded to the situation with legislation to prevent the contin-
uation of such trusts by passing the Shennan Anti-trust Act was passed 
in 1890. 
As the industrialists were no longer able to form trusts, they soon 
resorted to a new form of combination, the holding company. The holding 
companies were soon back to the old tricks of the trust and in 1914, 
Congress passed the Clayton Act which prohibited holding companies that 
threatened competition. But the enterprising industrialists soon found 
a loophole in the Clayton law and began to acquire assets and stocks of 
competitors. Such was the beginning of major mergers and acquisitions 
which had been of little prevalence before. 
Fearing the business structure of pre-World War II Ger~any, which 
some believed was responsible for Hitler's rise to power, Americans be-
gan to view business cartels as politically dangerous. Thus, in 1950, 
the cellar-~efauver Amendment was passed. With the help of the Warren 
Court in the 1960's, risk-adverse firms were guided away from acquisi-
tions of competitors and toward acquisitions of unrelated business. 
Such a legal environment fostered the growth of conglomerate mergers. 
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In 1982, there were reports of 2,321 mergers involving a transac-
tional value of $66 billion. In 1983, that number increased to 2,365 
mergers or partial mergers of U.S. based companies2. Recent flurries of 
mergers in the oil industry has prompted threats of legislation limiting 
mergers within that industry. Criticism abounds regarding the unpro-
ductiveness of mergers and acquisitions. Mergers and acquisitions are 
common, newsworthy business events. While a great deal of empirical 
research has transpired concerning the productiveness of mergers, no de-
finite conclusions have been produced. 
In their quest for efficiency and market effectiveness, firms will 
often merge. One firm's acquisition of another has become commonplace 
within the last seventy years. The primary objective of any merger is to 
increase, in some mannner, the financial position of the acquiring firm. 
Three types of mergers exist: horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate. 
The horizontal merger is a merger of firms whose products are viewed by 
buyers as virtually identical, i.e., the products have a high 
cross-elasticity of demand. The vertical merger is an acquisition of a 
supplier or customer wherein the product of one firm is input for or 
marketed by the other firm. A conglomerate merger is any that is 
neither vertical nor hortizontal and the products of the acquiring and 
acquired firm are not competitive or vertically related. The primary 
focus of this paper is the conglomerate merger. 
Conglomerate mergers can be viewed as representative of all mergers, 
for three major reasons. First, the same motives exist for all mergers 
regardless of their form of organization. Basically, all mergers are 
motivated by profit, power, or capital gain, a nd it can be assumed this 
is the case regardless of the form by which the merger is consummated. 
The second reason is that all mergers must be viewed in their economic 
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context and, "all mergers must be tested by the same standard whether 
they are classified as hortizontal, vertical, ·conglomerate, or other. 11 3 
The third reason conglomerates are viewed as representative of all 
mergers is that the subset of all mergers are included with the conglom-
erate merger; thus, the definition or label of the process is relative. 
Conglomerate mergers have significant economic, pol.itical, and 
social consequences. In order to gain some insight into the welfare 
effects of conglomerate mergers, the Bureau of Economics of the Federal 
Trade Commission {FTC) published major reports in 1969 and 1980. The 
underlying theme of Economic Report on Corporate Mergers4, was that 
conglomerate firms reduce economic efficiency by hampering competition, 
by engaging in reciprocal· dealings with their customers, reducing 
potential entry, and cross-subsidizing predatory effects that increase 
market concentration. Recently, The Economics of Firm Size, Market 
Structure, and Social Performances was published by the FTC. The thrust 
of this study examined how the conglomerate affects income distribution, 
worker satisfaction, political power, and community welfare. While 
these issues are important considerations, they are not the focus of 
this paper, but are presented to show the criticism and misunderstanding 
that exists among the American public and politicians concerning 
conglomerate mergers. Many Americans confuse the mergers of companies 
with the combination of firms that occured with the trust. 
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While corporate mergers and acqusitions involve many complex 
facets, the scope of this project is to review evaluation procedures and 
to provide an understanding of the objectivity of mergers. The purpose 
of this paper is to first review the literary base of corporate mergers, 
second, to review the prevailing models of merger evaluation, and third, 
to present an original model of merger evaluation based upon James 
Tobin's q ratio. 
This project was carried out in the following procedures: 
1. A review of relevant research that has investi-
gated the objectivity of mergers and acquisitions. 
Presentati on of relevant research for a basis of un-
derstanding of the merger evaluation methods pres-
ented 
2. Presentation of current quantitati ve analyt i cal 
methods for evaluation prospective merger and acqusi-
tions 
3. Discussion of James Tobin's q theory and the 
implications of this theory as a method of merger 
evaluation 
4. Analysis of Tobin's q ratio as a method for eval-
uation of 39 companies that were acquired or merged 
in 1982 and 1983 based upon 1979-1981 data 
5. Application of Tobin's q theory on 75 randomly 
selected firms to evaluate their potential for 
takeover 
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II. LITERARY REVIEW 
Merger and Acquisition Objectivity 
The purpose of a merger can basically be classified as (1) risk-
adverse, (2) diversification oriented, (3) synergetically motivated, or 
(4) financially or econcmically ameliorated. These four classifications 
vary greatly among each other, but are nr>t mutually exclusive or collec-
tively exhaustive. Each of these objectives are discussed in the liter-
ary research and will be reviewed in this study. 
Weston (1970) identifies three types of multi-industry firms: 
financial conglomerate, managerial conglomerates, and concentric firms. 
The financial conglomerates are those which exercise financial control 
and responsibility and do not participate in management. The managerial 
conglc::merates are those which are managed by the parent company. Con-
centric companies involve carry-over management in activities of the 
segments of the firm between closely related functions. All three types 
have as an objective reduction of risk synergism. 
Risk Reduction 
Many mergers occur to reduce the risk to the acquiring firm. This 
is closely related to, but not synonomous with, the next reason of diver-
sification which is a much broader area than risk reduction. Managers 
often seek risk reduction as a method of securing their own positions. 
Amihud and Lev (1981) studied the managerial objective of risk re-
duction as a motive for conglomerate mergers. Two tests were used to 
test the hypothesis of managerial risk reduction. First, the actual 
number of mergers performed as a measure of propensity to diversify was 
used to find whether the intensity of mergers is associated with the 
type of control of the firm, i.e., owner controlled versus management 
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controlled. The second test was aimed at finding whether diversification, 
by whatever means, is associated with the type of firm control. The first 
test focused specifically upon mergers, while the second focused upon all 
risk-reducing measures. 
Conclusions of this study were that risk reduction is not a motive 
for mergers from the stockholder's J?Oint of view, but it may be the motive 
for managers who are trying to reduce their own employment risk. Empirical 
findings were: (1) management controlled firms were engaged in more con-
glomerate mergers than owner-controlled firms, and (2) regardless of means 
of diversification, the management-controlled firms were found to be more 
diversified than owner-controlled firms. 
Often, corporate control is an objective of mergers, and many large 
firms seek to increase the market share or business power through a mer-
• 
ger. Halpern (1983) found that if corporate control is the rationale for 
the merger, then it was very likely that the target firm would have earned 
a significantly negative abnormal return some time before the merger 
occurred. 
Many times financial risk aversion is the purpose of mergers. Levine 
and Aaronovitch ( 1981) .found that other than size and capital market as-
sessment, the acquiring firm did not differ significantly from the ac-
quired firm in its financial. structure. This study concluded mergers to be 
strategic decisions as opposed to methods for immediate economic gain. In 
the s9ffie study, Levine and Aaronovitch asserted that the larger the firm, 
the smaller the variation of profitability than the smaller firms, so that 
investment in large firms involves less risk. This topic is closely 
related to a later discussion involving financial synergism. 
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Financial risk diversion is accomplished by acquistion of firms with 
negatively-correlated cash flows. Through this method, the firm's cash 
stream is held constant; thus, the reduction in financial hazard is 
achieved. A study by Jagpal and Brick (1982) found that homogeneous 
risk aversion occurs if, and only if, the profit streams are negatively 
car-related. When risk-aversions are heterogeneous, conglomerations may 
be feasible even when th~ profit streams are positively correlated. 
Some studies have found that little advantage lies in the diversif-
ication effect; instead, the advantage is achieved in the financial 
markets. A study by Levy and Sarnat (1970} concluded that in a perfect 
capital market, an economic advantage · c·annot be achieved by a purely 
conglomerate merger. This study indicates that despite the stabilizing 
diversification effect, a conglomerate merger does not necessarily 
create opportunities for risk diversification over and beyond what was 
already possible to an individual investor before the merger. By in-
creasing the size of the firm, however, a merger may create opportun-
ities for risk diversification over and beyond what was already possible 
to an individual investor before the merger. By increasing the size of 
the firm, however, a merger may create financial advantages, such as 
access to capital markets available only to larger firms. It is obvious 
that the possibility of simultaneous losses by all components of a 
merger are less than an individual investor's probability. Thus, the 
conclusion is drawn that the real benefits received from mergers are due 
to capital cost economies from less risk. 
Diversification 
Mergers which are diversification oriented are those which occur 
to increase the efficiency of the acquiring firm by diversifying the 
product line, smoothing the cash flow, compensating business and 
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economic cycles, and allowing entry into new ind?stries in which entry 
might otherwise be prohibited. Lewellen (1971) contends that intra-
industry mergers, which involve firms whose earning streams are closely 
correlated, may occur to realize operating efficiencies . Conglomerate 
mergers , however, often occur to smooth out earning streams and acquire 
additional debt capacities received in a merger. 
A study by Smith and Schreiner {1969) measured diversification 
efficiencies . by examining how close the portfolios of conglomerates and 
mutual funds were to the efficient frontier of investment opportunities 
available at the end of 1967. Using the Sharpe (1966} measure of excess 
portfolio return divided by the standard deviation of the returns, a 
measure was calculated for examination of diversification for each con-
glcmerate and mutual fund in the study. With this measure, eight mutual 
funds and nineteen conglomerates were ranked. The top four ranked were 
mutual funds and thereafter both were conglomerates and mutual funds. 
The average measure of diversification efficiency was 0.602 for the 
mutual funds, somewhat higher than the average value of 0.42B for the 
conglomerates. Thus, by the Smith and Schreiner test, on the average, 
mutual funds achieved greater efficiencies of diversification than the 
conglomerates. 
Whether or not mergers do in fact provide the acquiring firm with a 
greater diversification is manifest in the financial statements of that 
firm. It is to no avail for a firm to diversify and yet not accomplish 
economic and financial gain. While not investigating the financial 
markets advantages asserted by Levy and Sarnat, Weston and Mansingka 
(1971) compared the financial performance of a conglomerate with a 
randcxnly selected control group. The conclusions of this study 
were .that little if any difference exists in the profitability of 
the conglomerates and the control group. 
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A study by Lev and Mandelker (1972) focused on the differences in 
the acquiring firm in the period before and after the merger. This study 
was cross-sectional in nature and ccmpared the characteristics of the 
acquired firm with those of the acquiring finn before the merger. This 
study concluded that characteristics of the combined firm are not sig-
nificantly different from those of acquiror. Thus, from this study, the 
acquired f inn has taken on the attributes of the acquiror in the union 
of the two firms. 
Mergers often allow the acquiring firm to, enter a new industry with 
less effort and capital as well as allowing the firm to acquire new 
method or product ideas from the acquired firm's research and develop-
ment department. Chakrabarti and Burton (1983) examined the technolo-
gical characteristics of mergers in manufacturing during the decade of 
the 1970 1 s. A comparision was made between the 1974-1975 time period 
and 1979. The average size ratio of the acquiring to acquired in the 
1974-1975 period was 18.5, but by 1979, the figure had dropped to 9.9, 
implying that larger companies are becoming targets of acquisitions. The 
nature of mergers was found to not have changed between the two time 
periods such that no particular type of acquisition was dominant in the 
1970's. 
While Gort (1962) contended that mergers were prompted by 
technological changes in R & D intensive industries, the study by 
Chadrabarti and Burton concluded this not to be the case during the 
decade of the 197D's. It was found in this study that acquistion 
occurred predcrn.inately in firms with low and medium R & D intensitiy and 
this did not change throughout the 1970's. Further, there was actually 
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a decrease in the acquisition of finns high in R & D throughout the 
1970's. Conclusions of this study stated that the pattern as well as the 
level of mergers did not differ significantly during the previous 
decade. This study also concluded that mergers -were motivated by a de-
sire for diversification and reduction of systematic risk, as about one-
half of the mergers in previous decade occurred between firms in the 
same industry. 
Synergy 
Mergers are often prompted by illusion of the expected financial 
efficiency of the merged firm. While synergism may be a by-product of 
mergers, it appears to exist in a financial realm, i.e., debt capacity 
rather than operating efficiencies. The synergism effect may be defined 
by the cooperative action of two firms such that the total effect of the 
two firms together is greater that the sum of the two effects taken in-
dependently. Thus the synergism effect is simply that two merged firms 
can operate more efficiently than the combination of the two operating 
independently of each other. 
Hauger and Langetieg ( 1975) directed a study to determine if a 
merger of two firms produced effects different from those which might 
otherwise result from the purchase of both company shares by an indi-
vidual investor. A synergistic effect would result because the merger 
might make it possible for the finn to enter new product lines. This 
would change the level of stability of the old line as well as the 
cyclical nature of the firm's profitability. This study examined 59 
major industrial mergers, comparing the merging companies with a control 
group for a 36 month period prior to the merger and 36 months following 
the merger, to determine if the retUins are significantly different for 
the two periods. The conclusions were that synergism does not take 
place within the scope of this study and that any investor could have 
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achieved the same results as those achieved by the merger. This con-
clusion does, however, examine the possiblity of financial synergism re-
sulting from the merger of two firms. 
A study by Choi and Philippatos (1983) also considered the synergism 
effect in mergers. Using a regresssion model for the period 67 months 
prior to 8 months prior, as compared to a period 5 months after to 64 
months after the merger, abnormal as well as cummulative abnormal returns 
were calculated. Statisical analysis was performed upon the merged group 
and was compared with that of the control group. The con-clusion of this 
study found evidence of overall synergism which may re-sult from finan-
cial synergism resulting from increased financial leverage. 
Financial synergism is examined by Kim and McConnell ( 1977). Finan-
cial synergism is described as the increase in the value of the combined 
firms created by financial transactions that are attributable to the 
merger activity and cannot be replicated by any transaction of the inves-
tors in the capital market. The realization of financial synergism can be 
seen as the stability in the income of the two merged firms improves due 
to the merger, and the market value of debt of the two firms increases 
due to the effect of co-insurance. The merged firms are able to attract 
additional financing which, in turn, increases tax savings from the addi-
tional inter.est payments. The Kim and McConnell study failed to find 
evidence to support such financial synergism, even though debt financing 
generally increases following the merger. 
Jarrell and Bradley ( 1980) observed that the average tender premium 
prior to the Williams Act (1968) is about 33%. After 1968 it was about 
53% for federally regulated tender offers. These results do not 
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necessarily mean the acquiring firm's position was worse, but rather 
their new requirements could result in success of only synergetic 
mergers in which the successful bidder could afford to pay a higher pre-
mium and still be able to produce profitable results. 
Steiner (1975) contends that often there exist tax motives exist 
for mergers. As corporate tax losses can be carried forward to offset 
future income, firms with large losses and dim future prospects may be-
cooi.e targeted for takeover. While tax losses are not salable, they may 
be sold via the merger route and create an incentive to merge that would 
otherwise not exist. In the period 1963-1968, 85% of all mergers were 
consummated tax free through Section 368 of the Inernal Revenue Code. 
In such a situation the assets of the acquired firm go on the books of 
the new firm for tax purposes at whatever value they previously had, and 
stockholders in the new firm realize no capital gains until their stock 
is sold. 
The Federal Trade Commission's Economic Report on Corporate Mergers 
(1969) states on page 152 concerning Textron: 
Operating losses on some of its textile operations were more 
important sources of tax losses in 1952-1954, but most of the 
subsequent tax losses came frc:m its sale of acquired plants, 
equipment, and in six instances, .entire enterprises which had 
been acquired. Textron began its diversification program in 
1953 with 2 acquisitions1 by 1962 it had completed 37 more 
mergers. In this period, Textron's annual sales increased 
from $71 million to $550 million. Textron's tax losses were a 
major factor in rootivating its growth by merger, in building 
up a glamorous reputation for growth of sales and earnings, 
and in financing many of mergers.6 
Carleton, et al .. , ( 1983) distinguished three types of firms: non-
acquired, acquired in a cash takeover, and acquired in an exchange of 
securities. Their findings that cash takeovers have been increasing 
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throughout the 1970's was attributed to finding that the median of ex-
change used in a merger was directly related to whether the acquisition 
was taxable or nontaxable by the IRS. In the 1960's,. many mergers were 
consummated using convertible bonds, because the interest payment for 
the acquiring firm was tax deductable. It was proposed that actually the 
acquiring firm did not realize the value of the convertible bonds, as no 
:cequirement was noted to reflect the diluting effect upon conversion. 
Whether this is true or not, now fully diluted earning per share must be 
reported according to Accounting Principles Board Opinion Number 15. 
Consequently, a substantial rise has occurred in the number of firms 
acquired in a cash takeover. 
Financial Gains 
Financial amelioration or immediate financial and economic gain, is 
often a reason for mergers. It is probably viewed by the public as the 
main purpose for which mergers transpire. Often firms acquire other 
firms to "get a bargain" in the merger or to be able to purchase the ac-
quired company in the market at a much lower price than individual as-
sets are actually worth. Conglomerate mergers of the 1960's did in fact 
involve such motives, and many firms were bought and sold piece by piece 
at a substantial profit for the acquiring firm. Such a motive seems to 
exist and is often exercised by some firms which hope to reap a quick 
profit. In fact, such a profitable possibility seems to be rare within 
the market today. 
Weston (1970) states that a rise in the price earning ratios from 
the 1950's to the early 1960 1 s resulted in faster a stock price growth 
rate than the growth rate in earnings. The greater valuation placed on 
growth caused the advent of various methods t o increase the growth in 
earnings per share. Thus, the emphasis on higher price-earning ratios 
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acted as a catalyst for mergers and acquisitions. The hope of immediate 
improvement of price-earning ratios through acquisition became the impe-
tus for mergers. 
Firth's (1979) results suggest a higher price-earning ratio of the 
acquired firm compared to the acquiring firm in the period leading up to 
the takeover is not sufficient to guarantee investment gains. A firm 
with a low PE ratio and low valuation ratio will, therefore, constitute 
a relatively good buy even though subsequent share-price movements may 
cancel out immediate capital gains. The efficient market hypothesis 
states that all mergers reflect the true value of the firm and perfect 
disemination of information occurs. The value of the firm is subseqently 
determined and reflected in the bidding price of the successful acquir-
or. If the returns to the stockholders of the acquired firm are abnormal 
beyond the announcement month, then the failure of share prices to 
incorporate the information on the share purchase would be inconsistent 
with the efficient market hypothesis. Informal acquisition announcements 
are made by management and then reflected in the financial press. For-
mal announcements are made through Schedule 13-D which must be filed 
with the Securities Exchange Commission by the acquiror of more than 
five percent of a class of common stock within ten days of the open mar-
ket purchase. Potential corporate takeovers are often predicted as the 
purchases reported in the 13-D are often followed by merger proposals. 
The concept of competition in the acquisition market entails rivalry 
among bidding firms, as each potential bidder evaluates the value of the 
firm and advances the offer as long as it is advantageous to do so. This 
process continues and the offer is raised until the merger has a 
negative net present value for the sucessful bidders. This would mean 
even if only one price is offered that no gains are availabl e to any 
other potential bidder at the bid price. 
Gort and Hogarty (1970) examined a number of aspects of mergers. 
Their statistical analysis indicated that the stockholders of the ac-
quired firms gained on the average, while the owners of the acquiring 
firm lost on the average. They also found that mergers have a neutral 
effect of the aggregate worth of the firms that engaged in mergers. 
Hogarty (1971) attempted to measure the profitability of mergers. A 
successful merger was defined as one which increases the present value 
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of the owner's interest in the firm. Forty-three firms which were heav-
ily involved in merger activity between 1953 and 1964 were analyzed. The 
findings of this investigation revealed that the investment performance 
of heavily-merging firms is generally worse than the average investment 
performance of firms in their respective industries. Secondl y, this 
study concluded that since the stock price performance of acquiring 
firms was worse than their per share earnings, it would appear that a 
merger is at least perceived to be a risky form of investment. Those few 
highly successful mergers tempt other firms to engage in merger activ-
ity, which for the most part is not profitable according to this study. 
An empirical investigation of the market for acquisitions was pre-
sented by Mandelker (1974). This study tested the perfectly competitive 
acquisition hypothesis and the efficient capital market hypothesis. 
Mankelker's findings were that the market does provide perfect dissemina-
tion of information. The price the acquiring firm paid for the acquired 
finn's stock would allow the stockholder to receive nonnal returns on the 
acquisition. The abnormal gains in acquisitions are, however, received 
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by the stockholders of the acquired finn. This study also concluded that 
anticipatory price movements prior to the consummation of the merger re-
flect all economic gains expected from the merger. While prices did not 
adjust following the merger, the beta of the firm changed, and rates of 
return adjusted accordingly with the change in risk. 
Ellbert (1976) presented data which was inconsistent with Man-
delker's findings. In this study, Ellbert found that the acquiring firm 
does in fact realize significant gains from mergers. Ellbert uses the 
performance of the com.man stock of the acquired to conclude that compe-
tition does exist in the acquisition market. However, other studies 
have not found this to be the case. Ellbert's study was one of only a 
few to conclude that significant gains are achieved by mergers. 
Ruback {1983) concludes that the market for corporate acquisitions 
is competitive, and that on the average, the successful price offer ex-
hausts all p::>tential gains for successful bidders. Asquith (1983) con-
cluded that on the announcement ·date, the abnormal returns for success-
ful and unsuccessful bidders are similar. This suggests that the market 
does not distinguish betweeen successful and unsuccessful offers until 
the outcome of the offers is released. This is consistant with the 
resu.lts of Bradley, et aL, (1983), Bradley•s study reported that aver-
age abnormal returns for an unsuccessful bidder was about 1.3 percent 
over the five day period prior to the first public announcement, but a 
cum.rnulative negative 4.7 percent return for the forty days following the 
public announcement. Consistent with Ruback's findings, no significant 
abnormal returns were associated with either the announcement of the 
offer or the failure of the offer found in this study. 
Franks (1978) concluded that the gain to shareholders whose 
interests were acquired by the acquiring firm prior to the bid 
announcement were substantially less than the gain received by the 
shareholders after the bid announcement. This result suggested that 
gains to merger participants were partially realized before any formal 
public announcement concerning the merger of the firm was made. 
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A study by Madden (1981) examined eighty-six major acquired compan-
ies which were acquired beween November, 1977, and June, 1979. The exam-
ination over the 22 months surrounding the announcement month of the 
acquisition found significant positive abnormal returns both in the 
announcement month and the immediate preoceeding month. Thus, the lack of 
significant abnonnal returns on the period following the announcement is 
in agreement with the efficient market hypothesis. 
Research by Firth (1979) studied the premium actually paid for the 
acquired firm above the market value of shares, and the movement in share 
price in and just after the month in which the takeover announcement was 
made (from a study of 224 mergers during 1972-1974). It was found that 
the owners of the acquiring firm suffered negative returns which almost 
exactly matched the !X'Stitive returns to the acquired companies share-
holders. 
Discrimination of median of exchange and the abnormal returns of a 
merger were investigated by Yagil (1980), Yagil found that from 1948-
1975, fifty percent of all mergers were stock exchanges, twenty-nine per-
cent were cash, and twenty-one percent were a combination of various ar-
rangements. The cununulative abnonnal returns (CAR} for the eight months 
before the merger date was 5.3% for the acquiror and 18.7% for the 
acquiree when the acquisition was financed with securities. For cash 
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mergers, the CAR over the same period was 7.9% for buyers and 31.9% for 
sellers. It appears that if any abnormal returns are to be realized in 
an acquisition, the gains will be realized by the owners of the acquired 
firm rather than the owner of the acquiring firm. Most studies show the 
market to reflect a worse position for the acquiring firm after the mer-
ger than before the merger. 
~n explanation of merger activity over time is presented by Melicher 
et al~(1983), in a study of mergers fran 1947-1977. It has been argued 
that anticipated economic prosperity "'°uld provide a basis for explain-
ing aggregate merger activity over time. This study revealed only a weak 
relationship between merger activity and economic conditions for the per-
iod 1947-1977. Using a univariate time series model, Melicher concluded 
aggregate merger activity was actually related to capital market condi-
tions. The results indicated that changes in merger activity relate to 
current and prior changes in stock prices and bond yields. Considering 
that merger negotiations started two quarters before consummation, 
efforts in negotiations appear to reflect anticipation of rising stock 
prices and falling interest rates which would result in a more receptive 
and less costly financing environment for mergers to take place. 
While it has often been stated that the primary motive for mergers 
was immediate financial gain, this is not so. Most studies in the area 
have concluded that, in fact, a merger can often be detrimental to the 
acquiring firm, due to the support found for the efficient market hypo-
thesis. It appears that presently all gains are received prior to the 
takeover, and the acquired firm's stockholders are the recipients of any 
abnormal gains. 
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Merger Evaluation Methods 
There are basically three approaches to valuing a firm considered 
for takeover according to Brigham (1982). These are: (1) market ap-
proach, (2) valuation of the finn's assets, and (3) capitalization of 
expected cash flows. The market comparable approach is based on the 
actual market prices of canparable assets. The valuation of the firm's 
assets approach may be calculated by: 
VA = E +D = NWC + FA + IA 
where 
VA= value of the firm 1 s assets 
E shareholder's equity 
D = long term debt 
NWC = net 'NOrldng capital 
FA ~ fixed assets 
IA = value of intangible assets 
IA is a residual that will occur if the value of the firm is greater 
than the value of the assets. It should be noted that economic obsole-
scence results in a discount on the value of the firm's assets. 
The discounted cash flow method is probably the most feasible of 
the methods. This method projects the available cash flows of the firm 
for several years and then discounts it at an appropriate rate consider-
ing the value of money and involved risk of the firm. The expected cash 
flow is calculated 
ECF CFO - (NWC + CE - D) 
whe r e 
ECF = expected value of cash flow 
CFO cash flow provided by current operations 
NWC net working capital 
CE = capital expenses 
D = incremental long term debt 
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The cash flow provided by current operations is the most important 
variable and is determined by sales-expenses. Sales may be detennined by 
time series analysis and statistical demand analysis. Upon determination 
of sales, the contingency variable of expenses may be calculated through 
regress.ion analysis of historical data being divided into fixed, vari-
able, and semi-variable expenses. Working capital may be determined by 
historical working capital ratios and applied to projected figures. The 
detennination of capital investment is more subjective, based upon the 
age of the plant, present physical condition of the plant and the econ-
omical and technological obsolescence of the plant. 
A rate of return must be determined to evaluate the ECF and to cal-
culate a determined value of the cash flow of the firm. This rate of 
return must take into consideration the risk-free rate of government 
securities, a premium for business risk based upon the volatility of the 
firm's market, and a premium for financial risk that relates to the 
firm's financial structure. The computation of the required rate of 
return is: 
where 
k = required rate of return 
Rp risk free return 
RB business risk 
Re = capital or financial risk 
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Larson and Gonedes Model 
Larson and Gonedes (1969) use an an exchange ratio method of evalu-
ation of mergers. The exchange ratio is the number or shares the 
acquiring firm has given in exchange for one share of the acquired firm. 
Thus, by the exchange ratio method, the wealth position of the parties 
involved can be measured to see if it has increased or diminished. 
The Larson-Gonedes (L-G) model first analyzes the price-earning 
ratio of the individual'firms ccmpared to that of the acquired firm. 
This is presented more as an approximate cause rather than an observed 
effect; thus, it is not an evaluation method, but a cause of the merger. 
The earning multiple ratio is computed as follows: 
n 
Po #2 ( 1+2)tb Pn ( 1+~)n (Y/S) 0 (1+k)t + (Y/S)n X (Hk)n 
t==1 
where 
Y/S annual per share earnings 
g constant growth ratio 
k = .required rate of return by investors 
b = dividend pay out ratio 
Po = price in time O 
Pn = price in time n 
With all factors being equal, the PE ratio of the merged fi.nn 
should be greater than the average of the Uilmerged firms before an 
allowance for risk to qualify as a b e neficial merger . In theory , the g 
of the firm will vary directly with re-investment, and the k will vary 
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directly with risk and opportWlity cost. The L-G exchange ratio model 
determines which firms gain more incremental value from the merger. 
The current wealth position of the holders of common stock A is equated 
by: 
where 
WA s current wealth position of the holder of a share of 
common stock in ccmpany A (equal to the price per 
share of stock A) 
MA = PE ratio of A 
YA = total earnings of A 
SA= company's A total outstanding s t ock 
In the same manner the current wealth position of company B is calcul-
ated : 
Therefore, the expected post merged price of a share of stock of the 
merged company would be: 
1 
WAB (')(YA + YB) x (SA + (ER)Sg] 
where · 
WAB = expected price per share of the merged company 
' 
expected PE ratio of the merged company 
YA+Y9 = first period earning of the merged company 
SA+{ER)SB = total outstanding common s t ock of merged company 
SA A's shares outstanding before the merger 
S9 = B ' s shar e s outstanding befor e the merger 
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Thus, the wealth position of the holders of the merged firm will be in-
creased if: 
1 
WAB > (ER) WB 
The position of the acquiring firm will be improved if: 
Thus the maximum exchange ratio which is acceptable by the acquiring 
firm's stockholders is: 
The minimum exchange acceptable to the acquired firm's stockholders is 
calculated by: 
ERB= (MB) (YB/SB)(SA) 
The incremental value of the merger is calculated: 
If ER is greater than Wa/WA, the acquired firm will benefit in proper-
tion to the incremental value of the merger. Conversely, when the 
opp:>stite is true, the acquiring firm benefits from the merger. 
Conn and Nieisen Model 
Conn and Nieisen (1977) conducted an empirical test of the Larson-
Gonedes model of exchange ratio determination and concluded that 40% of 
the 131 mergers in their sample did not conform to the rationality as-
smnption of the L-G model. Further analysis revealed that the incident 
of wealth loss was much greater for acquiring firms than for acquired 
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firms. Also, a large number of mergers resulted in losses for the 
acquiring and the acquired firm such that 
where 
P price per share for company 1 or 2 
S number of shares of ccmmon stock outstanding 
The L-G model provides that the acquiring firm. desires the maximum 
exchange rate (ER), while the acquired firm desires the minimum ER. The 
ER is the number of acquiring firm's shares exchanged for each share of 
the acquired firm's equity. The ER ratio of company 1 and 2 are calcu-
ated as follows: 
ER2 = P2s2 
(PE12)(E1+E2)-{P2){S2) 
where 
PE = price/earnings ratio 
P = price of common stock 
S = number of shares of common stock outstanding 
E = earnings 
A comparison of the exchange ratio for the two merged companies to 
the ex post PE ratio then reveals the benefits received by whom in the 
transaction so that: 
(1)if ER1 >Actual Earnings Ratio (AER) > ER2, there is 
an increase to acquiror's weal~h 
(2)if AER > ER1 and ER2, both the acquiree and acquiror 
experience an increase in wealth 
(3)if ER2 > AER > ER1, the acquiree experiences an in-
crease in wealth 
(4)if AER < ER1 and ER2, both acquiree and acquiror 
will experience a loss in wealth 
The ex ante PE ratio (~) resulting from a merger premium 
depends upon the AER relative to P2JP1. In a positive merger premium 
the ex ante PE ratio can be determined by: 
P1 (AER (52) + S1) 
, --------------------
E 1 + E2 
or in the case of a negative premium such that AER < P2/P1 the AER=ER2 
so that 
P2 (S1 + 52 (AER) 
• = -----------------
AER (E1 + E2) 
The ex post PE ratio is calculated: 
Average P1 
R = -~----------------------( E 1 + E2)/ (S1 + 52 (AER) 
This empirical study supports the L-G model but rejects the null 
hypothesesis that there is no difference in the ex ante and ex post PE 
ratios. 
Scott's Model 
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Scott {1977) evaluates the effect of mergers upon the stockholders 
financial position. Scott's model deals with the following aspects of 
mergers: 
(1) Effects of merger value of equity on the merged 
firm vs. the unmerged firm's equity 
(2) The effect of mergers on non-contractual corpor-
ate liabilities in which (A) the rights to their 
payments are not marketable, (B) the amount of 
payment is fixed and not changed by payments 
(These non-contractual obligations include legal 
judgments on such obligations as sales and ex-
cise taxes) 
(3) The effect of the corporate income truces on the 
profitablity of the conglomerate merger if 
bankruptcy is possible 
(4) The effect on profitability on conglomerate mergers 
when the debt capacity of the merged firm exceeds the 
debt capacity of the unmerged firm. 
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Under the conditions of a perfect security market, Scott presents 
the followings mode~ to 
Sa = i'Pj j::J 
where 
the value of equity of firm A for pe r iod 0: 
(1-t) max [Qaj - Caj - Ra, OJ 
0 = period zero which is the present period 
Sa =firm A's equity value 
Pj = present value of one dollar, if any, only if 
state j occurs in the future period (state j 
pays one dollar if state j occurs and nothing 
if another state occurs) 
t 2 corporate tax rate 
Qaj = proceeds from sal.e of output 
Ra = total principal and · interest payment due A's 
bondholders in period 1 
Caj = A's obligation to noncontractual creditors in 
state j of period 1 
Scott argues that a conglomerate merger of all equity firms could 
never be profitable because the acquired firm i s weaker than the unmerg-
ed firm. Generally, acquired firms will not be as likely to go bankrupt 
as unacquired firms, and the cash flows from t he solvent firms are ap-
plied to noncontractual creditors of the otherwise insolvent firm. 
Scott further states that a merger is a transfer from noncontracutal 
creditors, and i.mder these conditions, a firm seeking to maximize the 
stock-holder's wealth will engage in divestitures. Thus, an equity 
merger i s determined to be profitable if Sab > Sa + Sb. 
The merger wil l b e profitabl e i f the debt capacity of the mer ge d 
firm exceeds the sum of the debt capacity of the unmerged firm. If A 
27 
and B merge, the capital structure does not change, as Rab = Ra + Rb. 
However, studies by Lewellen (1971) point out that the value of A.B's 
debt will exceed the combined to total value of unmerged firm's A and B. 
SGhick's Model 
Schick (1972) presents the following models to determine whether 
ROI of shareholders is actually increased in a takeover. First, the 
change in shareholder returns is calculated by the following formula: 
·" ~2Dt 
t'- 0 
Po 
where 
PN = price of share at time N 
Dt = Dividend received at time t 
RN = the difference in return produced by the firm's 
decision to merge 
P0 = price of common share at time 0 
D'N price of share at N if merger had not taken place 
D't = dividend received at t if merger had not taken place 
Studies conducted using this method generally conclude that there 
is no increase to the returns of shareholders as a result of a merger 
(Kelly, 1967 , Block, 1969, and Hogarty, 1970). It should be pointed 
out, however, that these studies have used two methods: (1) returns from 
a sample of firms which ignore the initial position of the merged firm 
(Hogarty), (2) returns from a similar non-merging firm (Kelly). 
Schick modifies this method by introducing calculated price per 
shares which are not subject to random fluctuations. The following is 
the modified model: 
Pt = Pt Et 
Pt = actual share price 
Pt calculated price of share as function 
of dividends 
Et = random error term with expected value 
=1.0 
Substituting this equation for the first equation, yields the 
following: 
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At this point, the above equation is multiplied by Po and a new 
quantity MEN is obtained by: 
Dt - Dt' 
Any MBN which is greater than 0 will increase the return to 
shareholders and the merger will be beneficial to the acquiring firm. 
Pt can be evaluated using Gordon's (1962) model for determining 
the price of a share at a given time period by using the following 
model: 
Pt = DtEt/(k - br) 
where 
Pt = price in time t 
Dt dividends in time t 
hr dividend growth rate 
Et = error term 
k investor's required rate of return 
29 
Simkowitz and Monroe Model 
Simkowitz and Monroe (1971) constructed a model to determine a 
financial profile of firms merged during a period of nine months in 1968 
by use of multiple discriminant analysis (MDA). The method divided the 
study into two groups: those that were acquired during the period and 
those that were not acquired during the period. The study was based 
upon the hypothesis that the financial profile of the finn, based on 
selected financial ratios, provides a basis for determining targeted 
takeovers. The MDA model is presented below: 
where 
Vi the ith discriminate coefficient for 
the ith variate 
Xgji= the valueof the ith variate of the 
jth subject in group g 
Zgj = the discriminant sc'ore for the jth 
subject in the gth group 
Simkowitz and Monroe used seven variables in the MDA model to 
measure (1) growth, (2) size, (3) profitability, (4) leverage, (5) 
dividend policy, and (6) liquidity. The variables were ccmputed using 
the following computations: 
{a) market turnover of equity shares 
(b) price earning ratio 
(c) sales volume 
(d) three year average dividend payout 
(e) three year average annual percent 
change in common equity 
{f) dummy variables f or negative returns 
(g) three year average common dividends/ 
last years common equity 
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Using this method, Simkowitz and Monroe were able to correctly 
classify an acquired firm in 82.6\ of the sample and correctly identify 
a non-acquired finn 72% of the time, for a total prediction rate of 77%. 
This study compared samples of acquired and non-acquired firms based on 
a group of financial ratios and used a discriminant model to classify 
finns based on financial characteristics. They concluded that the ac-
quired firms were smaller, have lower PE ratios, lower dividend payouts, 
and lower growth in equity. This study further observed that other 
non-financial characteristics were important. Their use of stepwise 
discriminant analysis with highly correlated data, however, makes it 
questionable as to which financial characteristics were significant. 
Gort (1969} attempts to measure the merger ratio, that is, the 
ratio of the number of acquisitions to the number of business firms that 
can be acquired. Gort bases his theory upon three conditions that pro-
mote mergers; ( 1) discrepancy in valuation, (2) reduction of competi-
tion, and (3) economies of scale. 
The discrepancies of valuation occur when a higher price is plac-
ed on the assets of the firm by the non-owners (acquirors) than by the 
owners. Reduction of cc:mpetition may allow the firm to provide barriers 
to entry into the market and allow larger gains in earnings. Thus, when 
barriers to entry are high, the value of the future earnings of the firm 
may greatly exceed the value of its physical assets. Economies of scale 
allow for the acquiring f~rm to acheive its desired size at a lower 
cost than construction of new facilities; thus, a merger is advantageous 
if economies of scale do exist. 
Gort presents the following models for a measure of the three 
c ondi tio ns : 
(1) Y = f(T,C,G) 
~y > o, ~y > o, 
'ST ~c 
~ y > 0 
~G 
(2) Y = g(C,G,Llc) 
c 
"y > 0, ~y < 0, )I y > 0 
~c oG C).U.£ 
c 
( 3) y = h(..b.. !:_, G, a!) 
A p 
a cl_! > o, ()y <. 0 f y 
~A 6G d~p 
A p 
where 
Y = merger rate 
T measure of technical change 
c = concentration ratio 
c = change in concentration ratio 
c 
A = change in average size of firm 
A 
p = change in number of firms 
p 
> 0 
Results of this hypothesis test support valuation discrepancies 
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and reduction of competition while there is no support for the economies 
of scale hypothesis. 
Shackett, Brown, and Mock Model 
Shackett, Brown, and Mock (1971) presented a model which deals 
with a determination of return on equity (r) where: 
r = earnings 
equity 
earnings/share or EPS 
equity/share BV 
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Thus, if EPS increases by 4% and BV increases by 11%, r must decline by 
6 % (1-1.04/1.11), EPS, rather than return on equity, is reflected in 
the market price of common stock so that an appropriate equation is 
EPS = r x BV. 
The optimal merger candidate should have a greater growth rate 
and a smaller price-earnings ratio than the acquiring firm so that 
PEA ( 1 + ~)n 
x --------- > , 
PEa (, + gA)n 
where 
PEA PE ratio of company A stock 
PEE ~ PE ratio of company B stock 
gA = expected annual growth rate of income for 
company A 
gB = expected annual growth rate of income for 
company B 
For the merger to be beneficial, the shareholder wealth must be 
increased (eventually) and reflected by an increase in the value of the 
shares of the firm in the market. The PE ratio now adjusts to the new 
expected growth rate, so that the postnerger common stock price is 
greater than the unmerged common stock as shown: 
1 + (EATB/EATA) 
----------------------- > -----------------
where 
current net income of company A 
. EATB current net income of company B 
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PEA = price earnings ratio of company A stock 
PEs price earnings ratio of· company 'F.l stock 
k cost of equity capital 
EATA 
z 
------------
EATA +EATB 
b percent of earning retained 
r = return on equity 
This assessment of corporate merger is limited to firms with the 
following characteristics: 
(1) the PE ratio of the acquiring firm will remain 
unchanged by the merger 
(2) each company has approximately the same tax 
rate 
( 3) both firms have low debt-equity ratios 
( 4) the merger will take place by exchange of 
common stock of the two companies 
Based upon this, the merger will be profitable if the EPS of the 
acquired firm's stock, which was issued to acquire it, is greater than 
the premerger EPS of the acquiring firm. 
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Tobin' s q Ratio 
James Tobin's q ratio is defined as the ratio of market value to 
net replacement cost of plant, equipment, and inventory. Tobin's q was 
introduced by Tobin (1969) and was based upon the premise that if investors 
value assets at prices which are greater than replacement costs then there 
are strong inducements for investments in preproducable real capital. The 
basic germ of the idea for the q ratio was originated by John Keynes 
(1936). Keynes states on page 151 of his writing: 
" ••• the daily revaluations of the Stock Exchange, 
though they are primarily made to facilitate trans-
fers of old investments between one individual and 
another, inevitabley exert a decisive influence on 
the rate of current investment. For there is no 
sense in building up a new enterprise at a cost 
greater than that at which a similar existing enter-
prise can be purchased; while there is an inducement 
to spend on a new project what may seem an extrav-
agant sum, if it can be floated off the Stock Ex-
change at an immediate profit. Thus certain classes 
of investment are governed by the average expect-
ation of those who deal on the Stock Exchange as re-
vealed in the price of shares, rather than by the 
genuine expectations of the professional entrepreneur." 
Keynes' statement that there is no sense in building a new enterprise 
when one can be purchased for less (not to mention the debugging cost, 
time factor of implementation, etc.) is the basis for application of this 
ratio as an evaluation method of mergers and acquisitions. Much research 
has been done concerning Tobin's q , but most of that research has been in 
the area of the ratio's influence on the capital markets. Intuitively, 
one would think that q could measure to a certain degree the financial 
advantage of an acquisition as opposed to entry into a new market or 
product line fr om a cold sta r t . If a f irm can be purchased in the marke t 
for less than it costs to organize from the ground up, certainly the prudent 
firm would prefer the former. 
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A firm that sought to maximize the stockholder's wealth would 
determine its investment decision based upon the induced change in the 
market value of the firm compared to the cost of acquiring new capital. 
If the cost was smaller than the change in market value of the firm, the 
shareholders would profit, but in the converse the shareholder's wealth 
would decline. Thus, stockholders would benefit from receipt of any 
funds that might be spent of any given project. Smith ( 1981.) studied the 
correlation between q and investment levels and concluded that a rela-
tionship definitely existed between q and the level of investment. This 
study concluded that investment would increase when the firm's value on 
the market was higher than the physical assets replacement cost (i.e., 
the q is greater than 1.0). Conversely, investment will decline as 
investment in physical assets is valued in the market below their 
replacement cost which results in a q less than 1.0. 
Tobin's q ratio has also been evaluated as an index for investment 
profitability for a firm. Ciccolo and Fromm (1979) evaluated approaches 
to determine the desired level of capital stock, and the effects of 
bankruptcy and taxes_when equity and debt were sources of finance for 
investment. Their conclusion was that the use of debt financing by a 
firm permits leverage of earnings to stockholders, but increases the 
risk of bankruptcy, and therefore increases the required rate of return. 
When physical asset investment increases, the marginal product of cap-
ital falls, and as risk increases, the expected rate of return falls as 
the required rate of return rises. Thus, the q ratio may be seen as an 
indication of relative potential profitability for investments of the 
firm. If this is the .case, then the potential for synergism from a 
merger would be increased. 
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Holland and Myers (1979) studied the q ratio as an effect of capit-
al cost in the market trends. Their analysis conclud~d that during the 
first 20 years following World War II, the q ratio for the aggregate 
market was about 1.5. The following 12 years, however, the q ratio was 
below 1.0, reflecting that the aggregate market value of non-financial 
corporations was below the net replacement cost of the physical assets 
held by those finns. Holland anrl Myers determined 1965 to be the turn-
ing point for q, and until 1976, q was on an erratic downward course. 
Conclusions from this study indicated that q reflected the expected 
profitability of a firm's investment. Thus, any increase in q would be 
indicative of an increase in that firm's investment. 
Yoshikawa (1980) reviewed the micro-economic foundations of the q 
ratio. Desired capital stock is determined first, and the investment is 
derived from the discrepancy between the desired level of capital stock 
and the actual level of capital stock. Allowing a divergence between 
the value of capital as set forth in.the financial market and the price 
of capital goods explains investment as a result of short-run 
disequilibrium set forth by Yoshikawa. 
Malkiel, Von Furstenberg, and Watson (1979) studied q as a deter-
mination of desired future stock of capital. This study shows no stat-
istical significance concerning the effect of changes in a level of out-
put relative to trends or changes in capacity utilization rates on in-
vestment in the industries studied. Tobin's q ratio was, however, stat-
istically significant in the majority of cases. Industries do not act 
as if they forecast next year's q to be the average of all previous q's. 
These industries do assume that deviations in q will remain and require 
continuous adjustme nts in the stock of capital until q is constant and 
the growth rate of capital is restored. 
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Overview 
The purpose of this study is to determine if James Tobin's q ratio 
is an acceptable method of evaluating merger candidates. If the q ratio 
of a sample of merged firms is significantly different from that of a 
sample market q, then q could have some implications on merger activity. 
Therefore, the following hypotheses are set forth: 
( 1) A.. q acquired < A q market, 
(2) ,#_, q acquiring > ..q q market, and 
( 3) ;ii{_ q acquiring > .)(, q acquired 
The first hypothesis contends that those firms which are acquired 
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will have a smaller q than those of the market sample, i.e., the ratio of 
market value to net replacement value is smaller for acquired firms. The 
logic behind this hypothesis follows the thought set forth by Keynes t h at 
firms which can be bought. in the market for less than they can be started 
will be very attractive to other firms who wish to enter a new business. 
The second hypothesis states that the acquiring firms will have a higher 
q ratio t han the market sample. This indicates that the market reflects 
a higher value for these firms relative to their assets than for the 
random sample. The third hypothesis states that the q ratio of the 
acquiring firm is expected to be statistically different from that of 
the firms being acquired. The s e hypothese s are neither mutually exclus-
ive nor collectively exhaustive. 
Both acquiring and acquired firms were selected from a listing of 
the 100 largest acquisitions (in dollars) as listed in Mergers and 
Acquisitions for 19 837 and 19828. Acquired firms that met the following 
criteria were used: 
(1) The company's financial data was available on 
Standard and Poor's Compustat tapes 
(2) The company's financial data was available on 
Financial Accounting Standard Board's tapes 
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A random sample of acquiring firms was selected from firms which also met 
the above criteria. 
Using data from Standard and Poor's Cornpustat tapes and the 
Financial Accounting Standard Board's (FASB) tapes, Tobin's q ratio was 
calculated on the selected firms. Using the Statistical Analysis System 
(SAS) package, statistical evaluation of the results were performed. The 
remainder of this chapter is devoted to detailed procedures of this 
study. 
The Firms 
Those companies that met the criteria prescribed above were selected 
for this study. Thirty-three acquired companies were involved in this 
study. These companies are listed in Table 1. Data was collected for 
any combination of the years 1981, 1980, and 1979. The value of these 
transactions ranged between $4.4 billi on and $100 million. 
Forty-one companies were randomly selected from a list of firms 
that were active in acquisition between 1981 and 1983. The selected 
firms are listed in Table 2, along with the firm(s) which were acquired. 
Privately-held companies were not included in this listing, as financial 
data for such firms is not made available to the public. Acquisitions 
made by private investors also lacked any financial data and are not 
considered in this study. 
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TABLE. 1 
ACQUIRED FIRMS IN STUDY 
Year in Year in Value 
Acquired Finµ Study Merger $ Millions 
ACF 79-81 1983 114 
Albany 80 1983 270 
Allied Telephone 81 1983 118 
American Can 81 1982 446 
Bendix 79-80 1983 1,800 
Campbell Taggart 80-81 1982 570 
CCI 80 1983 100 
Continental Group 80-81 1983 510 
Ci ties Services 79-81 1982 4,202 
Dan River 80-81 1983 153. 9 
Diamond International 80-81 1982 400 
Dillingham 79-81 1983 350 
El Paso 79-81 1983 1,276 
Gearhart 80 1983 117 
Gulf Oil 80-81 1983 909 
Harris 79-80 1983 250 
Heublein 79-80 1982 1t620 
Interpace 81 1983 151 • 2 
Itek 79-81 1983 240 
Martin Marietta 79-81 1982 1 t 193 • 7 
Maryland Cup Corp. 80 1983 530 
Missouri Pacific 79-81 1983 1,028 
Norton Simon 79-80 1983 990 
Northwest Energy 81 1983 819 
Pabst 79-81 1982 179 
Pargas 79-81 1983 155 
Pittson 80-81 1983 1,276 
Purex 79-80 1982 358 
Raymond 79-81 1983 165 
Suburban Propane 79-80 1983 270 
Thiokol 81 1982 562 
Warner Communications 81 1982 103 
Wheelabrator-Frye 80 1983 946 
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TABLE 2 
~QUIRING FIRMS rr STUDY 
FOR 1981 
Company 
Allied store 
American Standard 
Anheuser-bush 
Bally Manufacturing 
Burlington Northern 
Capital Cities Communication 
Centel Corp. 
Coca-Cola Inc. 
CPC International 
Dart and Kraft 
Dow Chemical 
Du Pont De Nemours 
Ethyl Corp. 
Fort Howard Paper 
General Electric 
Hercules Inc. 
IBM 
Lone Star Industries 
Martin Marietta 
Mid-Continent Telephone 
Monsanto 
Motorola 
Northwest Energy 
Occidental Petroleum 
Ogden 
Penn Central 
Reading and Bates 
Reynold Inc. 
Schlumberger 
Sears, Robuck and Co. 
Smith International 
Smithkline 
Southland Corp. 
Standard Oil of Indiana 
Teledyne 
Tenneco 
u.s. Steel 
Warner-Lambert 
Williams Co. 
Xerox 
Firm Acquired 
Garfinckel Inc. 
Trane Co. 
Campbell-Taggart 
Six Flags Corp. 
El Paso 
Cable Com General 
Asarco Inc. 
Columbia Pictures 
CF Mueller co. 
Hobart Corp. 
Richardson-Merrell 
Conoco 
First Colonial Life 
Maryland Cup 
Picker Corp. 
Simmonds Precision Products 
Intel 
Marquette Co. 
Bendix Corp. 
Allied-Telephone 
Fisher Controls International 
Phase-Four Systems 
Cities Services Gas co. 
Ci ties services 
Allied Maintenance 
Northern Propane 
Gould Inc. 
Heubleim Inc. 
Applicon Inc. 
Dean Witter Reynolds 
Gearhart Industries 
Beckham Instruments 
CITGO Petroleum 
Harbert Corp. 
Kidde Inc. 
Houston Oil 
Marathon Oil 
Imed Corp. 
Northwest Energy 
Crum and Forster 
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The sample size selected is justified by a procedure set forth by 
Lapin (1973) for evaluation of sample size validity. The method for 
sample size selection used by Lapin is as follows: 
z2 (5 2 
n --------
e2 
where 
n sample size 
z = risk of committing error 
CS= standard deviation of the population 
e = tolerable error acceptance level 
Lapin contends that ()2 is approximately equal to the standard 
deviation of the sample ( s2} and s2 may be substituted for (f 2. For the 
sample involving acquired firms s2 was determined to be .2874, and the 
e was set at 10%. The following computations were made upon this formula 
2 2 s2 
n -------
e2 
z2 (.2874)2 
33 = -------------( • 1 ) 2 
z2 = 3.995 
1. 9987 
This figure i s located on a z-value table to conclude tha t with 
a 95% confidence level , thi s sample is truly r epresentative of the 
p opul a tion f rom which it was drawn. When the s ame p r ocedure was appl i e d 
to the 44 companies that were actively involved in acquiring other firms, 
a 98% confidence level wa s found i n the sample. 
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The Model 
The model used to calculate q is set forth in a study by Ross and 
Lindenberg (1981), which was predicated upon a study by Tobin and 
Brainard (1977). The basic Ross and Lindenberg model is developed 
below: 
q 
where 
Market Value of Firm 
Net replacement value 
of property, plant, and 
inventory of firm 
Market Value of Firm MV (Debt) + MV (Common Stock) 
+ MV (Preferred Stock) 
The market value of debt is determined by a procedure followed by 
Tobin and Brainard. An economy-wide annual index of the value of corp-
orate bonds is determined, based upon Standard and Poor's average compo-
site high grade bond price for a given year.9 If the average price for 
all bonds in 1969 was $68.63 for $100 per bond, this price was converted 
into an index for that year, i.e., .6863, which was then multiplied by 
the long term debt outstanding in 1969, to arrive at the market value of 
a firm's debt. A more complex procedure is used by Ross and Lindenberg, 
which deals with bond issue and return at a rate of 5% per year, with 
value of the bonds based upon yield to maturity for each year. This, in 
effect, yields the same value as Tobin's method. The index used is based 
upon the assumption that all bonds have a 20-year maturity and are issu-
ed at par with price indexes based on average yield indexes. Thus, this 
index shows the market's valuation of all bonds (considering twenty year 
issues) for any given year. If a fi r m had one million dollars worth of 
bonds in 1969, which had been issued and retired at a rate of 5% per 
year, the market would, as a whole, (by means of the market prices) 
value these bonds at $686,300. Short-term debt of less than one year 
was valued at book value and added to the value of long-term debt, to 
determine the total value of debt. 
The market value of common stock is derived by the total shares 
outstanding multiplied by the year-end closing price. Both of these 
items were available upon the Compustat tapes. The market val ue of the 
firm's preferred stock was calculated by a procedure used by both Ross 
and Lindenberg, and Tobin and Brainard. Preferred stock dividends from 
the Compustat tapes were divided by a Standard and Poor's preferred 
stock yield index10 to determine the market value of the preferred 
stock. Again, the market value is determined by the actual market. 
When the market value of debt (long-term plus short-term debt) is added 
to the market value of common and preferred stock, the market value of 
the firm is determined. 
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The replacement value of property, plant, and inventory has been 
calculated through complex procedures in many other studies. This part-
icular study, however, relied upon the replacement value reported by the 
firms in compliance with the Securi ties and Exchange Commission's 10-K 
schedule, which is reported on the FASB tapes. 
The FASB tape contains information disclosed by 1,200 companies, in 
compliance with the Financial Accounting Standard Board, Statement 33. 
The data was obtained directly from the companies via forwarded 10- K 
reports. In meeting the requirements set forth by the SEC and FASB, 
these companies reported the replacement value of the firm's assets. 
Thi s figure was then applied to the replacement value formula. 
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Replacement value of the firm was defined by Ross and Lindenberg as: 
RCt ~ TAt + RNPt - HNPt + RINVt - HINVt 
where 
RCt 
TAt 
RNPt 
HNPt 
RINVt 
HINVt 
total replacement cost in year t 
total assets at historical value in year t 
net plant at replacement cost in year t 
= net plant at historical value in year t 
inventories at replacement cost in year t 
inventories at historical value in year t 
Historical values were accessed by means of Compustat tapes, while 
replacement costs were derived from the FASB tape. A conversion was 
necessary, as the FASB data is listed in millions of dollars, whereas the 
Compustat data is listed in tens of thousands of dollars. Further, the 
number of shares outstanding were listed in thousands. Conversion to 
tens of thousands of dollars was necessary to accomplish calculation of 
the q ratio. All variables used are given in the appendix. 
The Selection of the Market Sample 
A listing of companies was first determined by those companies that 
met the same criteria as mentioned before. Eight hundred thirty-four 
companies met these qualifications. Using a procedure set forth by 
Stockton and Clark (1971), a random selection of these companies was 
made. These companies were assigned numbers between 500 and 1334. The 
75 companies were selected by use of a random number table for each of 
the three years in the study. While 75 companies were selected, not all 
companies' financial data was available for that year. For 1981, 44 
companies were available and for 1980, 43 companies were available for 
analysis. Since the initial selection involved 75 companies, the same as 
the other two years, no further selection was made, and 30 companies' q 
was calculated for 1979. All companies are listed in Table 3. 
1981 
American Electric Power 
Arnfac 
Arkansas Best 
Avon Products 
Bally Manufacturing 
Bell and Howell 
Castle and Cook 
Connecticut Natural Gas 
Copperweld Corp. 
Detroit Edison 
Dorsey 
Forest City Enterprises 
General Motors 
B. F. Goodrich 
Ingersoll-Rand 
Kerr Glass 
Kimberly-Clark 
Long Island Lighting 
Mattel 
McGr aw-Hil 1 
Michigan Energy 
Resources 
Middle South Utilities 
Nevada Power co. 
Oklahoma Gas & Electric 
Orange and Rockland 
Pacific Lumber 
J. c. Penney 
Pfizer 
Piedmont Aviation 
Polaroid 
Public Service of 
Indiana 
Purolator 
Raymark 
RCA 
Rohn and Hags 
Sharon Steel 
Stauffer Chemical 
Supermarket General 
Texas Instruments 
TRW 
VF Corp 
Weis Markets 
Western Co of North 
America 
Zayre 
TABLE 3 
RANDOMLY SELECTED FIRMS 
1980 
Abbot Labs 
ArVin 
Bassett Furniture 
Brockway 
Cameron Iron Works 
Carter Hawley Hale 
Chesebrough-Ponds 
Cluett, Peabody & Co. 
Colt Industies 
Control Data Corp. 
C F National 
Cyclops 
Disney Productions 
Eagle-Picher 
Eastman Kodak 
Evans Products 
Ferro Corp. 
FMC 
Fotomat 
Gannett 
General Tire 
Grumman 
Harsco 
Hesston 
International 
Harvester 
Kay Corp. 
Loews Corp. 
Magic Chef 
Monogram Industries 
Munford 
Newmount Mining 
Olin 
Paccar 
Parker Drilling 
Rubbermaid 
Scovill 
Telex 
Transway 
Uniroyal 
wean United 
Whirlpool 
Witco Chemical 
F. w. Woolworth 
1979 
Allis-Chalmers 
Amerace 
American Cynamid 
Baker International 
Beker 
Borden 
Borg-Warner 
Capital Cities Comm. 
Celanese 
Crystal Oil 
Deere & Co. 
Di Giorgio 
Oravo 
El Paso 
Fisher Food 
General Refactories 
Harsco 
HRT 
Lamson and Sessions 
Midland-Ross 
National Semi-
conductor 
Norton Simon 
Phibro Salomon 
Quaker Oats 
Reichhold Chemical 
Shackler 
Stanley Works 
Toys R US 
Uniroyal 
Wal-Mart 
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Defense of Procedure 
The procedure used to calculate the q ratio is comprised of two 
elements: the market value of the firm and the replacement value of the 
firm. Both of these elements will be examined in light of the procedure 
used in this study. The basic procedure of q = market value/replaceme.nt 
value i~ the same as that followed by Tobin and many others who have 
since used his methodology. It is therefore assumed that the basic 
procedure is acceptable in the fact it is widely published and read in 
financial literary circles. 
Following procedures used by both Ross and Lindenberg, and Tobin 
and Brainard, the market value of long-term debt was determined by the 
use of an aggregate index for all firms. While this procedure may lack 
the acuteness of accuracy that might be desired, it is acceptable as it 
conveys the value of all debt for all firms. This paper did not follow 
the detailed method used by Ross and Lindenburg, as such manipulations 
were beyond the scope of this ' study. The index used, i.e., the Standard 
and Poor's price of aggregate twenty-year bonds valued at yield to 
maturity based upon average yield, is considered to be acceptable, though 
admittedly not the most refined method. Valuation of preferred stock by 
the method used in this paper is also acceptable in financial 
literature, e.g. Chappel and Cheng (1982). 
This paper deviates substantially from any previous method in calcul-
ation of q by using FASB data to calculate the replacement value of the 
firm '.s property, plant and equipment. This procedure is defended by the 
fact that detailed procedures have been used to calculate the replacement 
value of as sets in accordance wi t h the FASB. Thus retrieval of such data 
fran the FASB tapes makes available estimates of replacement values by 
means of acceptable accounting practices. Though different from any prev-
ious method, this q ratio may be defended as a viable method. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
Introduction 
In this chapter, results from procedures outlined in the previous 
chapter will be presented and statistical applications will be discussed. 
The first section presents the calculation of q ratios for the acquired 
firms. The second section presents the calculated q for the acquiring 
firm, and the next section relates to the random market sample. 
Statistical measures are given within each group and then among the 
groups. The results from this statistical analysis are then related to 
prescribed hypotheses, and conclusions are made concerning the q ratio as 
it affects merger activity. 
Acquired Firm's q 
Following the procedure described in the previous chapter, Tobin's 
q was determi ned for acquired firms. The data was first grouped by firm 
and presented in Table 4. As a group over the three year period, the 
average q was .6943 with a standard deviation of .4776. The minimum 
value was .2464 and the maximum value was 3.9856. Approximately 92% of 
the observations were below 1.0. When Gearhart Industries' q of 3.9856 
was removed from the sample, the mean q was .6436 and the standard 
deviation became .4106. 
An observation concerning Table 4 should be made. In firms in 
which three years of data exists it appears that q was declining from 
1979 to 1981 in a negative correlation with higher interest rates. One 
would expect that as interest rates increase the market value of the 
firm wi l l decline, reflecting (1) decline in market va lue of debt, ( 2 ) 
decline in common stock price as investors require a higher rate of 
return, and (3) decline in preferred stock value as preferred stock declines 
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proportionately with interest rates. In the denominator, replacement 
value would rise in relation to inflation during the period 1979-1981. 
While no statistical basis exists'for this observation, nor any suffic-
ient data to make such an observation, this follows with what one could 
intuitively expect for this period of time. 
When the data is broken down by individual years, the following 
occurs: 
Stan. Minimum Maximum 
Year N M~an q Dev. Value Value Variance 
1981 22 .5928 .2601 .2464 1.4167 .0676 
1980 27 .7941 .6762 .2595 3.9856 .4522 
1979 16 .6652 .2279 .2615 1.1407 .0519 
When Gearhart Industries' q of 3.9856 is deleted from 1980, the follow-
ing changes are made: 
Year N Mean q 
1980 26 .6347 
Stan. 
Dev. 
.2433 
Minimum 
Value 
.2595 
Maximum 
Value 
1. 4367 
Variance 
.0621 
Concerning the mean, gradual decline is noted when the extremities are 
removed. Thus, from the standpoint of the means, a statistical decline 
is evident from 1979-1981 in the q ratio of acquired firms. 
Company 
ACF 
Albany 
Allied Telephone 
American Can 
Bendix 
Campbell Taggart 
CCI 
Continental Group 
Cities Services 
Dan River 
Diamond International 
Dillingham 
El Paso 
Gulf Oil 
Gearhart 
Harris 
Heubleim 
Interpace 
Itek 
Martin Marietta 
Missouri Pacific 
Maryland Corp. 
Norton Simon 
Northwest Energy 
Pabst 
Pargas 
Pittson 
Purex 
Raymond 
Suburban Propane 
Thiokol 
Warner 
Wheelbrator-Frye 
TABLE 4 
ACQUIRED FLRM 1 S q RATIO 
(GROUPED BY FIRM) 
1981 q 1980 q 
.3754 .4926 
.8006 
.4241 
.4657 
• 7521 
.5823 .5472 
• 7115 
.4525 .4865 
.5181 .5627 
.3526 .3889 
.7191 .6655 
.5201 .5509 
.6918 • 7842 
.4161 .5097 
3.9856 
, .4367 
.1759 
.4578 
.82 71 .8774 
.4 771 • 7067 
.2464 .2596 
.5416 
.7162 
,4343 
-----
.6671 .4564 
.5598 .6514 
.7562 • 7564 
.7449 
.7519 .9110 
.5270 
1.0693 
1.4161 
.9128 
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1979 q 
.4467 
.6736 
.4331 
.6911 
.9224 
1.1407 
.7825 
.892 2 
.7070 
.2616 
.6678 
.3876 
.6671 
.7529 
.7405 
.5843 
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Acquiring F~pn's q 
The q for firms which actively acquired other firms in 1982 or 1983 
is given in Table 5. The average of all q's for the acquiring firms 
sampled is .9906 with a standard deviation of .5818. The q for acquiring 
firms ranged from .2104 to 3.0168. When the two extreme values of 
Schlumberger (2.9051) and Smithkline (3.0169) are removed, the mean drops 
to .9237 with a standard deviation of .3428. 
Another extremity that should be noted is Burlington Northern's q 
ratio of .2104, which is relatively low for this sample. Investigation 
of this firm reveals a great deal of depreciated assets, e.g., rail 
lines, forest, etc. Further investigation reveals excessive cash re-
serves as a result of the depreciation taken on these assets. It should 
be noted, however, that some questions exist as to whether Burlington 
might become a take-over candidate itself. 
The only year that was observed for the acquiring firm's q was 1981. 
The reason for this observation is that the q ratio of the aggregate 
market varies from year to year reflecting interest rates, market 
expections, etc. Since the q ratio was measured across the market for 
random firms as well as the acquired, these ratios would be reflected 
only after the merger was consummated, and prior to the last year of the 
study the ratios of the acquired firm would not be reflected in the new q 
ratio of the acquiring firm. Some mergers, however, may not be reflected 
in the 1981 q ratio anyway. 
TABLE 5 
q RATIO OF ACQUIRING FIRMS FOR 1981 
Allied· Stores 
American Standard 
Anheuser-Busch 
Bally Manufacturing 
Burlington Northern 
Capital Cities Communication 
Cent el 
Coca-Cola 
CPC International 
Dart and Kraft 
Dow Chemical 
Du Pont De Nemours 
Ethyl Corp. 
Fort Howard Paper 
General Electric 
Hercules 
IBM 
Lone Star Industries 
Martin Marietta 
Mid-Continental Telephone 
Mons an ta 
Motorola 
Northwest Energy 
Occidental 
Ogden Corp. 
Penn Central 
Reading and Bates 
R.J. Reynolds 
Schlumberger 
Sears, Rcebuck and Co. 
Signal 
Smith International 
Smithkline 
Southland 
Standard Oil of Indiana 
Teledyne 
Tenneco 
u.s. Steel 
Warner-Lambert 
Williams Co. 
Xerox 
.7658 
.9179 
.9027 
1.3852 
.2104 
1.6970 
.5863 
1. 4297 
1.1046 
1.0011 
.7050 
.6725 
.6700 
1. 93 34 
1.0919 
.7679 
1.6356 
.5270 
.4771 
.4216 
.7555 
1 • 0601 
.5758 
.6753 
.6597 
.6639 
.9749 
.8327 
2.9051 
.4531 
.8827 
1.3652 
3.0168 
• 7912 
.8811 
1.1580 
.6734 
.4228 
.9848 
.5466 
1.2425 
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Random Firm's q 
The q ratio was calculated on the firms within a random sample for 
1979-1981. The calculated q's are given in Tables 6-8. For 1981, the 
average q calculated from the randomly-selected firms was .8563 with a 
standard deviation of .4147 and a range from .3413 to 2.0137. 
An oddity existed in this sample in the fact that 16% of the firms 
in this sample were classified with an SIC industry code of 4911 - firms 
involved in electrical services. The Compustat tape firms (from which 
this sample was selected) involved in electrical services account for 
only 2.8% of all firms. A new adjusted mean was calculated when the 
following firms were removed: (1) American Electric Power, (2) Detroit 
Edison, (3) Long Island Lighting, (4) Middle South Utilities, (5) Nevada 
Power Company, (6) Oklahoma Gas and Electric, and (7) Public Service of 
Indiana. The adjusted mean q was .9460 with a standard deviation of 
.3931. 
The adjusted mean q was the more preferred account of random sampl-
ing, as the q ratio of the electrical facilities in 1981 were among the 
lowest of those randomly selected. Further analysis was done using both 
the random q and the adjusted q. 
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The firms for 1980 that were randomly selected and their q ratios 
are listed in Table 7. The mean q ratio for this group was .9675 with a 
standard deviation of .6004. The randomly chosen group ranged from 
3.9490 to .1601. When Walt Disney (3.9490) and Ferro (.160 1) were 
dropped from consideration, the mean was lowered to .9587 with a standard 
deviation of .3924. The group appeared to lack any obvious abnormalities 
as existed in the 1981 data. 
TABLE 6 
RANDOMLY SELECTED FIRMS' q FOR 19§1 
Company 
American Electric 
Amfac 
Arkansas Best 
Avon 
Bally 
Bell and Howell 
Castle and Cooke 
Conneticut Natural Gas 
Copperweld Corp. 
Detroit Edison 
Dorsey Corp. 
Forest City Enterprises 
B. F. Goodrich 
Ingersoll-Rand 
Kerr Glass 
Kimberly-Clark 
Long Island Lighting 
Mattel 
McGraw-Hill 
Michigan Energy Resources 
Middle South Utilities 
Nevada Power 
Oklahoma Gas and Electric 
Orange and Rockland 
Pacific Lumber 
J.C. Penney 
Pfizer 
Piedmont Aviation 
Polaroid Corp. 
Public Service of Indiana 
Purolator 
Raymark 
RCA 
Rohm and Haas 
Sharon Steel 
Stauffer Chemical 
Supermarket General 
Texas Instruments 
TRW 
v. F . corp. 
We i s Ma rkets 
Western Compa ny of North Ame rica 
Zayre 
q ratio 
.3622 
.7098 
.6784 
1.4594 
1.3905 
.8288 
.6313 
.4385 
.8999 
.3413 
.7185 
.8937 
.5366 
.8378 
.5208 
.8965 
.4121 
.9155 
2.0137 
.4220 
.3780 
.4352 
.3676 
.3818 
1.8520 
.8427 
1.4546 
• 755 7 
.9498 
.4519 
.3176 
.7371 
1.0401 
.9186 
.6899 
.6442 
• 7002 
1.2075 
.9786 
1.2875 
1.634 5 
1. 1761 
.7104 
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TABLE 7 
RA!iDOMLY SELECTED FIRMS' q fOR 1980 
Company 
Abbott Labs 
Arvin 
Bassett 
Brockway 
Cameron Iron Works 
carter Hawley Hale 
Cheesebrough-Pond 
Cluett, Peabody & Co. 
Control Data Corp. 
CF National Corp. 
Cyclops 
Walt Disney 
Eagle-Picher 
Eastman Kodak 
Evans 
Ferro Corp. 
FMC 
Fotomat 
Gannett 
General Tire 
Grumman Corp. 
Harsco Corp. 
Hesston Corp. 
International Harvester 
Kay Corp. 
Loews Corp. 
Magic Chef 
Monogram Industries 
Munford 
Newmont Mining 
Olin Corp. 
Paccar 
Parker Drilling 
Rubbermaid 
Scovill 
Telex 
Transway International 
Uniroyal 
Wean United 
Whirlpool 
Witco Chemical 
F.W. Woolworth 
q Ratio 
1.9818 
.6200 
1.0401 
.5274 
1.4450 
.6860 
1.5688 
.8240 
1.1256 
.5617 
.4406 
3.9490 
.7054 
1.2870 
.7079 
.1601 
1.7455 
.8898 
1. 7225 
.6026 
• 7925 
.9434 
.8762 
.6173 
.7789 
.4937 
• 714 7 
.7186 
.6066 
.8549 
.7373 
1.1016 
1. 0993 
1.4364 
.6787 
1.0299 
.9448 
.5395 
.6366 
1. 0722 
.7972 
.6219 
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TABLE 8 
RANDOMLY SELECTED FIRMS' q FOR 1979 
Companies 
Allis-Chalmers 
Amerace 
American Cynamid 
Baker International 
Beker 
Bordon 
Capital Cities Communication 
Celanese 
Crystal Oil 
Deere and Company 
Di Giorgio's 
Dravo 
El Paso 
Fisher Foods 
General Ref actories 
Harsco 
HRT 
Lamson 
Midland-Ross 
National Semi-Conductor 
Norton Simon 
Philbro Salomon 
Quaker Oats 
Reichhold Chemical 
Shaklee 
Stanley Works 
Toys R Us 
Wal-Mart 
warner 
q Ratio 
.7013 
.5000 
• 7390 
2.1550 
• 7809 
.6601 
2.0224 
.7389 
2.6090 
.9248 
.664 1 
.8195 
.7993 
.4845 
.5583 
,9970 
.671 8 
.3187 
1.0352 
1. 4942 
.7993 
.6678 
.9081 
.5371 
1. 3611 
1.0703 
.5573 
3.3743 
.9232 
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The companies selected for 1979 and their calculated q's are given 
in Table 8. While data was only available for 30 of the 75 randomly 
selected firms in this study, a 90% confidence level was established, 
using a method by Lapin which was described earlier. This group had a 
mean q of 1 . 0899 with a standard deviation of .7237 and a range from 
3.3742 to .3186. The following extremities were dropped: 
( 1) 
( 2) 
( 3) 
( 4) 
( 5) 
Baker International 
Capital Cities Communication 
Crystal Oil 
Toys R Us 
Wal-Mart 
2.1546 
2.0224 
2.6091 
2.4612 
3.3742 
An adjusted q was calculated to be .9864 with a standard deviation of 
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.3984. This adjusted q, however, was not considered later as it required 
deletion of 16% of the observations. 
A summary of the q ratios for the randomly selected firms is given 
below: 
Minimum Maximum Standard 
Year N 
.s Value Value Deviation 
1981 43 .8563 .3413 2.0 137 .4147 
1980 43 .9675 .1601 3.9490 .6004 
1979 30 1.0899 .3186 3.3742 • 7237 
When the extremities were dropped in 1979 and 1980 and the electric 
power firms in 1981 were dropped, the following tabulation resulted: 
Minimum Maximum Standard 
Year N 
.s. Value Value Deviation 
19 81 36 . 9460 . 3818 2 .01 37 .3931 
1980 41 .9587 .4406 1.9818 .3924 
1979 25 .9864 .3187 1. 4942 .3984 
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With the adjusted q's, a consistant standard deviation of the firms 
results, but for further analysis, only the adjusted q for 1981 will be 
used. The adjusted q for 1979 and 1980 will not be used because 
extremities both up and down will exist, and the sample size test 
previously determined the sample to be representative of the population. 
The 1981 sample, however, does not reflect the population and therefore 
the adjusted q will be used in for 1981. 
Analysis of Variance of q Ratios 
Statistical analysis was perfonned upon the q ratios to test the 
hypotheses set forth earlier. Those hypotheses were: 
( 1 ) ~ q acquired < Pl q random 
( 2) ,l;( q acquiring > N{. q random 
( 3 ) .I{ q acquiring > ""[ q acquired 
Based upon a simple comparison of the means, the following relationship 
exist: 
Year 
1981 
1980 
1979 
q randcm 
.9460 
.9675 
1.1137 
q acquired 
.5928 
.7941 
.6652 
q acquiring 
.9906 
The random q used in 1981 was an adjusted q but all others are actual 
q's. Based upon this simple comparison of means, hypothesis 1 is true 
for all three years of the study. Hypotheses 2 and 3 are true for 1981, 
the only year in which the acquiring firm's q's were calculated. This 
p rocedure , however , is not statistically acceptable , and no conclusions 
may be made based upon this comparison. 
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A more sophisticated method was used to test the three hypotheses. 
An SAS application for determining the analysis of variance among the 
means of the group was applied to the q ratio of the three groups for all 
years involved. The data used was the calculated q for all groups with 
the exception of 1981, which used an adjusted q. 
The first groups of data tested were the q's of the acquired firms 
for 1981 and the random q's for 1981. The results from the analysis 
provided an F-value of 6.95 with 61 degrees of freedom. This resulted 
in a p-value of .0106. Therefore, with an alpha of .05 (allowing for a 
95% confidence level), it is statistically asserted that for the year 1981 
hypothesis 1 is true, and the q ratio for acquired firms is less than the 
q ratio for a sample of market firms. 
Testing 1980 q's of acquired and random firms provided and F-value 
of 1.59 and a p-value of .2119. With a continued alpha of .05, hypo-
thesis 1 for 1980 must be rejected as false, and no significant differ-
ence exists for the group in 1980. The alpha would have to be increased 
to a value greater than the p-value in order for this hypothesis to be 
true. With such a value for alpha, the risk of committing a Type I error 
would be extreme. 
The q ratios of 1979 for acquiring firms and random firms were 
tested. The results of testing the difference between the means were an 
F-value of 5.32 and a p-value of .0258. With this group, hypothesis 1 
was indicated to be true at the 95% confidence level. 
When the random q's for 1981 were compared to the q's of acquiring 
firms for 1981, an F-value of 1.29 resulted. The p-value for this group 
was .2601. Based upon the same alpha level, hypothesis 2 is rejected in 
59 
that no statistical significance existed. A later analysis compares the 
adjusted q ratio for the firms with the acquiring firms' q's. 
Hypothesis 3 was the test comparing the analysis of variance among 
the means for the data of 1981 acquired firms and 1981 acquiring firms. 
This test resulted in an F-value of 8.84 and a p-value of .0042, 
indicating the greatest significance of any of the tests. As a result 
of this test, hypothesis 3 is accepted as true and statistical evidence 
suggests that the q ratio of the acquiring firms was greater than that 
of the acquired firms in the aggregate. This data cannot be applied to 
a one-on-one basis, i.e., that the acquiring firm has a larger q than 
the firm it acquires. 
When the adjusted q for 1981 i s used for analysis, hypothesis 1 re-
mains true and the p-value declines to .0006. The analysis of variance 
between the 1981 adjusted random q's and the 1981 acquiring firm's q's, 
however, provides a stronger rejection of hypothesis 2 with a p-value of 
.7717. Thus, the substitution of the adjusted q ratio has no effect 
upon the acceptance or rejection of the hypotheses. 
Summary of q Ratios 
All three hypotheses are supported by comparision of means only, 
but this is not an acceptable test of statistical significance. As a 
result of the statistical analysis of variance procedure performed upon 
the distribution of mean q ratios for each group, hypotheses 1 and 3 are 
accepted as true. Hypothesis 2, however, is rejected as false. Each 
hypothesis either has very strong support or is strongly rejected. The 
type I error is held to a minimum by the use of an alpha equal to .05. 
Even if this alpha is raised to .10 or lowered to .025, no bearing is 
made upon the acceptance or rejection of the hypotheses. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This paper investigated the use of James Tobin's q ratio as a 
method of evaluating mergers and acquisitions. The q's of several firms 
which were acquired were calculated for each of the three years prior to 
their takeover. These q's were compared to the q's of the acquiring 
firms immediately prior to the takeover. Further comparision was made 
with a random selection of firms. The results provided support for the 
hypothesis that the acquired firms had a lower q than the aggreagate 
market. Support was also given to the hypothesis that acquiring firms 
had a higher q ratio than acquired firms. No support was found for the 
hypothesis that acqui ring firms had a higher q ratio than the aggregate 
market q. 
Conclusions made from this study include: 
(1) While not true in a l l individual cases, on 
average the q ratio of firms acquired are less 
than the aggregate q of the market. 
(2) The q ratio of the acquired firms, as a whole, 
tends to be considerably less than the q ratio 
of all acquiring firms. 
(3) No conclusions can be drawn from this study on 
an individual basis, i.e., that in any given 
merger the q of the acquiring firm is greater 
than the acquired firm. 
(4) The q ratio of all acquired firms does not fit 
into an easily distinguished category, but 
rather covers a wide range. 
This study fails to provide any major pro-merger criteria for potential 
candidates, but i t does p r ovi de a guideline for establi shing pos sible 
candidates. Based upon this study, one could measure the market 
response of potential takeover targets as measured by q. While q as a 
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a method of evaluating candidates for takeover is by no means a panacea, 
it can provide some insight into the evaluation process. 
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APPENDIX 
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. 
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t I DOW CHEMICAL 6174 .0 2113.00 12496.0 
12 DU PONT (E.l . ) OE NEMOURS 12722 .0 4500 . 00 23629.0 
13 ETHYL CORP 658.3 147 . 03 1262.0 
14 FORT HOWARD PAPER 351. I 76.47 580 . 7 
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16 159410 170160 0 . 1236 0.3374 57418.7 0.0 357199 574028 1107890 0.51813 
17 6731 9401 0. 1060 0.4138 3890. 1 283.0 8341 19245 494 78 0 . 38897 
18 7512 10130 0.1236 0 . 3374 3417. 9 224 . 9 7608 18762 53206 0.35264 
19 21453 8832 0. 1060 0 . 4138 3654 . 7 2537.7 49764 77409 116313 0.66552 
20 20738 16270 0 . 1236 0.3374 5489 . 5 2096 . 3 55308 836 31 116304 0 . 71 908 -...J 
2 ( 296 92 17970 0 . 1060 0.4138 7436.0 805.7 23503 61436 1 11505 0.55097 ........ 
22 24977 16998 0.09 11 0.5558 9447.5 937. 4 9601 44963 65065 0.69 105 
23 33821 9649 0. 1236 0. 337 4 3255.6 292.9 20282 57651 110857 0 . 52005 
24 515400 141400 0 . 1060 0.4138 58511.3 0.0 839446 14 13357 2772800 0 . 50972 
25 577800 106400 0 . 1236 0.3374 6288 1. 4 0 . 0 648445 1289236 3109800 0.41457 
26 6'157 8723 0. 1060 0.4138 3609 . 6 0. 0 85372 95439 2394 6 3 . 98559 
SAS 15:09 MONDAY, AUGUST 20, 1984 2 
OBS COMPANY YEAR RINV RNP HNP HJNV TA COMMON CSPR I CE PREFOIV STDEBT 
27 HARR IS 1979 32327 42278 22400 20859 82270 2619.2 32 . 88 0 . 0 38433 
28 HARRIS 1980 38049 54095 33150 30322 113980 3043 . 0 52. 12 o .o 37396 
29 HE UBLEIM 1980 36194 55057 37200 30067 104700 2134 . 6 28.37 0.0 29955 
30 HEUBN 1979 37772 58127 34511 2748 5 97190 2124.1 29.7 5 0.0 26335 
31 INTERPAC 1981 8 710 10040 7320 78 97 233 70 407 . 6 17 . 00 52. 7 3514 
32 . ITEK 1979 6520 5660 4486 7776 214 70 393. 8 28 . 25 0.0 54 7 5 
33 IT EK 1980 7690 5900 4660 9122 25180 398 . 6 31. 25 0.0 7237 
34 IT EK 198 I 5370 5530 4 310 7958 21420 '103.6 18.60 o.o 7188 
3 5 MARTNMAR 1981 6 1800 270000 143940 46058 254590 3625.2 36 . 00 0.0 46469 
36 MISPAC 1979 11948 599656 167363 7964 2411 10 1549.0 5 1. 37 0.0 44491 
37 MI SPAC 1980 10800 720000 18961 6932 273020 1553 . 4 102. so 0.0 51222 
38 MI SPAC 198 I 13000 780000 2 14060 7724 30 3780 1556. I 82 . 00 0.0 52371 
39 MRTNMARI 19 79 34500 147000 84146 2 3998 177360 2485.4 46. 50 0.0 54106 
40 MRTNMARV 1980 47500 215000 107780 33788 206940 2494.8 72.00 0.0 45329 
41 MRYLNDCP 1980 11 554 31 398 16940 8426 35980 670. 7 28.88 2.5 6145 ~ 42 NOSIM 1979 61367 100143 41 146 82861 238920 4838.6 16.00 19 1.6 69552 
43 NOW EST 198 1 12211 178250 93713 12210 153795 1624.2 20.00 637.4 5 1673 t-cJ r<:J 44 NSIMON 1980 5 18 44 79731 45740 8691 1 262020 4802.9 15. 60 128.8 83708 8 45 PABST 1979 7987 40077 28348 7987 41020 817. 1 1 1 . 75 0.0 7837 H 1··: 46 PABST 19.80 7 8 42 40600 27670 7842 43030 817. 1 14. 87 0.0 8932 :><: i. 47 PAB ST 1981 7972 37272 24890 7972 40400 816.6 15.37 0.0 I 1088 
t-3 48 PARGAS 19 79 2895 12653 8462 278 4 15470 359 . 7 19.37 17 . 6 3690 G; ! : 49 PARGAS 1980 3277 13924 8724 3 101 16470 3 59.7 22. 50 14.9 4454 .. 
,- : 
50 PARGAS 1981 36 05 14240 8990 3632 17430 359 . 7 18.00 11. 9 5012 ~ . ' l'zi ! • 5 1 PASO 1979 16762 177292 251803 15669 356888 4681. 3 22.75 0.0 66775 
52 PASO 1980 20759 2 17137 177289 18219 299074 4763.7 25.25 0.0 98333 N 
1···: () OBS LONGDT PSINOEX DEBTINDX DEBTVAL PREF VAL COMMVAL MRKTVAL RE PLACE Q 0 1 ": z I': t-3 
27 9 094 0.091 t 0.5558 5054.4 0.00 8611 9 129607 113616 1.14074 H 
28 21585 0. 10 60 0.4138 8931. 9 0.00 158601 204929 142652 1 . 4365 7 2 
29 22544 0. 1060 0 . 4138 9328 . 7 0 .00 60559 99842 128684 0.77587 t<j 
30 23492 0.0911 0 . 5558 13056.9 0.00 63192 102584 131093 0.78253 t::1 
31 4286 0. 1236 0.3374 1446. 1 426. 38 6929 12316 26903 0 . 45778 
32 4 466 0.0911 0.5558 2482.2 0.00 1 11 25 19082 21388 0.892 19 
33 5391 0. 1060 0.4138 2230. 8 o.oo 12456 2192 4 24988 0 .87738 
34 5620 0. 1236 0 .3374 1896. 2 0.00 7507 16591 20052 0.82741 
35 35979 0. 1236 0. 3374 12 139.3 0. 00 130507 189116 396392 0. 47709 
36 95575 0.0911 0.5558 5 3120. 6 o.oo 79572 177184 677387 0 . 26157 
37 104606 0.1060 0.4138 43286.0 0.00 159223 25373 1 977927 0.2594 6 
38 105561 o. 1236 0.3374 35616 . 3 o.oo 127600 215587 874996 0 .24639 
39 13606 0.0911 0 . 5558 7562 . 2 0 . 00 1 15571 177239 250716 0.70693 
40 16297 0. 1060 0 . 4138 67 43.7 0. 0 0 179626 231698 327872 o. 70667 
41 8 3 86 o. 1060 0.4138 3470. I 23.58 19370 29009 5 3566 0.54155 
42 63909 0.09 t1 0.5558 35520 . 6 2103. 18 774 18 184593 276423 0.66779 
43 42053 0. 1236 0. 3 374 14188. 7 5156.96 32484 103503 238333 0 . 43428 
44 65391 o. 1060 0. 4138 27058.8 1215.09 74925 186907 260944 0.71627 
4 5 2028 0.0911 0 . 5558 1 127. 2 0.00 960 1 18565 5 2749 0 . 35195 
46 1468 0. 1060 o. 4 pa 607.5 0.00 121 50 21690 55960 0.38759 
" 47 1328 o. 1236 0.3374 448. I 0.00 12551 24081 52782 0.45635 N 
48 4209 0.09 11 0. 5558 2339.4 193 . 19 6967 13 190 19772 0.667 10 
49 3732 o. 1060 0.4 138 1544. 3 140.57 8093 14232 2 1846 0.65147 
50 32 5 7 0. 1236 0.3374 1098. 9 96.28 64 75 12682 22653 0.55983 
51 158659 0.09 11 0.5558 88182.7 0 . 00 106500 261457 283470 0.92235 
52 I 18833 o. 1060 0.4 138 49173. f 0.00 120283 267790 34t 462 0. 78424 
SAS 
OBS COMPANY VEAR RINV RNP HNP HINV 
53 PASO 1981 26107 279825 210592 25549 
54 PITTSON 1980 26236 105193 59917 24547 
55 PT SON 1981 26155 103006 59787 25777 
56 PUREX 1979 12449 14160 6341 12326 
57 PUREX 1980 10792 12852 7800 11640 
58 RAMDND 1979 1041 12176 10550 651 
59 RAYMOND 1960 1469 14179 10900 946 
60 RAYMOND 1981 2041 18267 14540 1492 
61 SUBPROP 1979 6056 31073 17029 4484 
62 SUB PROP 1980 6145 34339 19257 6056 
63 THIOKOL 1981 9240 22820 27810 12603 
64 WARNER 1981 79956 53568 37160 50735 
65 WHLABRTO 1980 23056 49833 36820 21893 
OBS LONGOT PS INDEX DEBTINDX DEBTVAL PREFVAL 
53 130305 0. 1236 0.3374 43964.9 0 .00 
54 12858 0. 1060 0 . 4138 5320.6 0 . 00 
55 13242 0 . 1236 0.3374 4467 . 9 o.oo 
56 4990 0.0911 0.5558 2773.4 147 . 09 
57 4584 o. 1060 0.4138 1896.9 104.72 
58 5319 0 . 0911 0.5558 2956 .3 0 . 00 
59 3561 0 . 1060 0 . 4138 1473.5 0 .00 
60 5857 0. 1236 0.3374 1976.2 0.00 
61 8140 0.0911 0 .5558 4524.2 0.00 
62 9154 0. 1060 0.4138 3787 . 9 0.00 
63 9B93 0 . 1236 0.3374 3337.9 0.00 
64 18746 0 . 1236 0.3374 6324.9 0.00 
65 26193 0. 1060 0 . 4138 10838. 7 2783.02 
TA COMMON 
371121 4846.0 
134580 3783.0 
134360 3787.9 
35760 1126 . 3 
37390 1128 . 1 
297 to 480.6 
32600 585.6 
41290 600 . 9 
30570 459 . 3 
35150 471. 2 
69650 1355. 1 
267360 6204 . 2 
193060 1692. 1 
COMMVAL MRKTVAL 
120520 305010 
96467 137320 
95152 134575 
17458 31411 
16921 30834 
8113 23494 
17129 33363 
13220 34260 
16535 269B5 
16021 26521 
46236 65542 
340486 443402 
89004 IBS 154 
15;09 MONDAY, 
CSPRICE PREFDIV 
24.87 0.0 
25.50 0.0 
25. 12 0.0 
15 . 50 13.4 
15.00 1 t. 1 
16 . 86 0.0 
29.25 o .o 
22.00 0.0 
36.00 0.0 
34.00 0 . 0 
34. 12 0 . 0 
54 . 88 0.0 
52 . 60 295.0 
REPLACE Q 
440912 0.69177 
181545 0 . 75640 
177957 0.75622 
41722 0.75287 
41394 0.74489 
31728 0. 74048 
36622 0 . 91102 
45566 0.75188 
46186 0.58427 
50321 0.52703 
61297 1 . 06925 
312989 1.4 1667 
207236 0 . 91275 
AUGUST 20, 
STDEBT 
140525 
35533 
34955 
11033 
11911 
12425 
1476 I 
19064 
5926 
6712 
15968 
96591 
86528 
1984 
~ 
t'rj 
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a 
H 
x 
1-3 
~ 
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SAS 15:06 MONDAY, AUGUST 20, 1984 
OBS COMPANY HNP HINV TA COMM CSPRICE PD STDEBT LTDEBT 
1 AMERICAN EL ECTRIC POWE R 9770.3 0.00 11567 . 0 161160 16.2 BB . 176 1486.58 1 1567.0 
2 AMFAC INC 537.0 390.31 1371 . 6 14083 26.4 0.862 4 11. 98 1371 . 6 
3 ARKANSAS BEST COR P 107 . 0 23 . 19 176.2 3701 8. 3 0.000 50.66 176. 2 
4 AVON PRODUCT S 51 8 .3 39 1 .so 1567.8 60156 30.0 0.000 527 . •IO 1567.8 
5 BALLY MFG CORP 375.9 100 . 69 705 . 3 258.32 29. 1 0.000 111 . 15 705 . 3 
6 BELL & HOWELL CO 68.0 135.30 408.9 5621 19.0 0.022 151 . 63 408 . 9 
7 CASTLE & COOKE INC 394.3 376. 14 1243.0 25534 10.2 0.000 326.65 1243.0 
8 CONNECTICUT NATURAL GAS CORP 128 . 9 0.00 171.0 1733 IB. I 0.643 64.37 171 . 0 
9 COPPERWELD CORP 2 16.4 101 . 24 416 .4 5727 36 . 6 0.000 125.70 416.4 ~ 10 DETROIT EDISON CO 5843.0 0 . 00 6607.8 95089 11. 3 57.566 925.86 6607 . 8 11 DORSEY CORP 124. 0 45.56 255.1 4129 18.0 0.329 71. 33 255. 1 H 
12 · FOREST CITY ENTERPR I SES INC 59 . 6 59. 12 203.4 404 9 13 . 6 0 . 000 95 . 95 203 . 4 ~ 13 GENERA L MOTORS CORP 20040.7 7222 . 10 3899 1 . 2 303627 38 . 4 12 . 900 3899 1. 2 r' 14 GOODRICH (B.F. ) CO 1333 . 2 464.00 2702 . 9 17665 22.2 9.000 622. 40 2702 . 9 t>:f 
15 INGERSOLL - RAND CO 657 . 6 1035. 16 2678 . I 19714 56.4 6.255 773. 83 2678 . I <: 16 KERR GLASS MFG 149. 7 64.46 276.9 4008 13.0 3.564 44.86 276.9 ~ 17 KIMBERLY - CLARK COR P 1383.2 390.00 2413.8 22030 65.6 0.000 585. 40 2413 . 8 
18 LONG ISLAND LI GHTING 404 1 . 8 0.00 4508.1 8 1371 14 . 1 48.830 361. 19 4508 . 1 ~ Prj 
19 MATTEL INC 123.8 196. 2 2 647.4 16531 11.0 6.042 243.32 647 . 4 Ul '"d 
20 MCGRAW-H I LL INC 143.3 138.54 8 79.4 24863 51.6 0.045 3 18 . 28 879.4 tx:I 
21 MICHIGAN ENERGY RESOURC ES CO 96.2 o.·oo 127.3 2 237 11. 2 0.000 39.04 127 . 3 ~s 
22 MIDDLE SOUTH UTIL I TIES 7672 . 8 0.00 8318 . 6 123787 12.5 60 . 591 1092 . 53 8318.6 ::>::! H 
:>< 23 NEVADA POWER CO 525.0 0.00 6 10. 1 8460 21.6 4.746 66.44 610 . 1 ~~ 24 OKLAHOMA GAS & ELECTRIC 1588.6 0.00 1819.9 34606 14 . 1 11.916 169.84 1819.9 25 ORANGE & ROCKLAND UTI LIT I ES 504.9 0.00 633.6 1 1262 13.3 4.753 90.97 6 33.6 
26 . PACIFIC LUMBER CO 126 .2 5 t. 2i 288.4 24259 24.6 o.ooo 42.95 288.4 0 L' 
27 PENNEY (J.C.) CO 1932.0 1578.00 6 216 . 0 71 868 28.5 0 . 000 1702 . 00 6216.0 Fi tx:I 
28 PFIZER INC 998.2 84 8 .20 3647.1 74952 53 . 2 0.000 1123.BO 3647. I t--4w 
29 PIEDMONT AVIATION INC 367.6 34.55 502.7 7974 27.0 0.596 130 . 89 502 . 7 Ul 
30 POLAROI D CORP 332.9 412.70 1434.7 32855 20. 4 0.000 352.30 1434.7 trj 
31 PUBLIC SERVICE CO OF IND 3020.9 0 . 00 3285. 5 42244 20.2 22 . 600 245.52 3285 . 5 ~ t>:f 32 PUROLATOR INC 126.9 43 . 88 297.5 6530 36 . 0 0.000 101 . 73 297.5 ("} 
33 RAYMARK CORP 60.0 97.7 1 242.8 2697 17. 4 0.000 82 . 00 242.8 t-'I 
34 RCA CORP 2429.1 1520.80 7856 . 7 75447 18.2 68.500 3062. 70 7856 . 7 trj t;:l 
35 ROHM & HAAS CO 537.5 376. 8 1 1348 . 6 12903 61. 0 o .ooo 290.73 1348 . 6 
36 SHARON STEEL 373.7 214 . 15 1199 . 1 82053 5.3 0 . 000 337.52 1199. 1 l"rj H 
37 STAUFFER CHEMICAL CO 1 170. 3 308.62 2033 . 9 44018 22.2 0.000 293. 16 2033.9 ffi 38 SUPERMARKETS GENE RAL CORP 339.7 207.38 636.8 8242 19.2 0 . 000 258.94 636.8 39 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INC 1105.5 372.00 2310.5 23580 80 .4 0.000 764.80 2310 .·5 
40 TRW INC 1002.3 700.97 3126 . 6 33257 54 . 6 8 . 530 888.66 3126.6 l"1j 0 41 VF CORP 105.5 109 . 05 399.5 8085 40 . 6 0 . 000 108 . BO 399.5 ::>::! 
42 WE I S MARKETS INC 88 . 2 47 . 00 254 . 6 914 1 37.4 0.000 42 . 47 254 .6 
43 WESTERN CO OF NORTH AMERICA 871. 5 42 . 99 1122.9 44698 23.6 0.000 141.09 1122 . 9 ...... l.D 
44 ZAYRE CORP 231 . 5 356 . 5 6 643.4 5412 28.6 0. 145 191. 99 643.4 CX> 
...... 
'1 
..,.. 
SAS 15:06 MONDAY, AUGUST 20 , 1984 2 
OBS REP INV REPLANT RINV RNP 
1 25537 2005400 255.37 20054.0 
2 45856 85342 458.56 853.4 
3 2543 13619 25 . 43 136 . 2 
4 45010 85260 450 . 10 852.6 
5 11176 45128 1 I I. 76 451. 3 
6 13940 13330 139 . 40 133. 3 
7 42100 69900 42 I .00 699.0 
8 1134 29656 11 . 34 296.6 
9 13829 29171 138.29 291 . 7 
10 39943 1124400 399.43 11244 .0 
11 7233 16475 72.33 164.7 
12 14940 1170 149 . 40 11. 7 
13 929980 2871080 9299 . BO 28710.8 
14 73150 195460 731 . 50 1954.6 
15 117640 I 16820 1176. 40 1168. 2 
16 6342 23998 63 . 42 240.0 
17 50080 203220 500 . BO 2032.2 ~ 18 9460 680000 94 . 60 6800.0 1-rj 19 19770 17840 197 . 70 178 . 4 tx:I 
20 14690 19810 146 . 90 198. 1 § 2 1 1017 21239 10 . 17 212.4 H 22 21258 1356365 212 . 58 13563 . 6 >:l 
23 2771 93367 27.71 933.7 ~ 24 7346 315705 73 . 46 3157 . 0 6; 25 2570 103714 25.70 1037 . 1 t-< 26 8200 20500 82 . 00 205 . 0 t:rj 
27 186700 236600 1867 .oo 2366 . 0 
28 93070 162850 930. 70 1628.5 w 
29 3921 54276 39.21 542.8 n 
30 41800 47900 418 . 00 479.0 0 z 31 2921 459420 29 . 21 4594.2 t-3 
32 4396 16107 43 . 96 16 I . 1 H 
33 10700 9400 107.00 94 . 0 2 
34 77000 214200 770 . 00 2142.0 trj 
35 49670 73760 496.70 737. 6 . l:j 
36 30680 78799 306 . 80 788 . 0 
37 51500 196700 515.00 1967 . 0 
38 24975 56315 249.75 563 . 1 
39 41600 160000 416 . 00 1600 . 0 
40 93080 148810 930 . 80 1488 . I 
41 11023 14888 110 . 23 148 . 9 
42 5925 10884 59.25 108 . 8 
43 4389 108670 43.69 1066 . 7 
44 37344 36490 373.44 364.9 
-..J 
VI 
SAS 15:05 MONDAY, AUGUST 20 , 1984 
OBS COMPANY HNP HINV TA COMM CSPRICE PD STDEBT LTDEB T 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES 729.40 418 . 02 2355. 61 122500 27 .0 0.000 863 . 47 2355 . 61 
2 ARVIN INDUSTRIES INC 113 .20 64.05 293 .40 685 3 14. 7 1 . 340 39.97 293 . 40 
3 BASSETT FURNITURE INDS 41 .68 42 . 43 200 . 9 2 6803 23 . 2 0 . 000 28.41 200.92 
4 BROCKWAY INC 277. 74 72.07 426.85 7463 14 . 4 0.000 86 . 96 426.85 
5 CAMERON IRON WORK S 465.78 383.08 1094. 35 30430 46.6 0.000 273. 11 1094 .35 
6 CARTER HAWLEY HALE STORES 828 . 34 554 . 70 1741.72 28920 15.0 1 . 962 402.80 1741. 7 2 
7 CHES EB ROUGH-POND'S INC 238 .29 348.98 1059. 43 32745 33.6 0.000 283 . 31 1059 . 43 
8 CLUETT, PEABODY & CO 74.00 211.90 442. 14 7981 15.0 1. 397 120 . 63 442. 14 
9 COLT INDUSTR I ES INC 470.82 483. 15 1490 . 32 13596 56.0 0 . 444 367 . 28 1490 . 3 2 
10 CONTROL DATA CORP 656.00 709.00 2825 . 90 37062 35. 2 1.600 748.80 2825 .90 ~ 
1 I CP NATIONAL CORP 206 . 56 0.00 268,61 2724 23.4 1.074 47 . 98 268 .6 1 ~ 
12 CYCLOPS CORP 160. 51 124 . 79 434.38 3428 25 .4 0 . 553 122 . 35 434 . 3 8 H 
13 DISNEY ( WALT) PRODUCT I ONS 1069. 3 7 11 8 . 65 1610.01 3 2433 52 . 2 0.000 191 . 57 1610 . 0 1 g; 
14 EAGLE - PICHER INDS 173 . 65 105.35 401 . 26 9632 14 .0 0 . 080 80.26 401. 2 6 r< 
15 EASTMAN KODAK CO 4157.00 1970 . 00 9446.00 162500 71. 1 0.000 2119.00 9446 .00 M 
16 EVANS PRODUCT S CO 257 .01 229.85 943.44 12363 17 . 4 4 .910 211.51 943 . 4 4 ~ ?d 
17 FE RRO CORP 135 . 59 100.63 392.27 772 6 28 .0 0.000 108. 10 392 . 2 7 ~~ 18 FMC CORP 1199.96 484 . 11 2738 . 8 6 32586 25 . 5 3.900 877.22 2738 . 86 c::: z 
19 FOTOMAT COR P 60.99 19.54 100.77 8911 6 . 4 0 . 000 2 8 . 59 100. 77 M t:l 
20 GANNETT CO 541. 58 34 . 06 1448.11 53045 36.1 0.000 · 295 .80 14 48 . 11 Ul H :>< 
21 GENERA L TIRE & RUBBER CO 595.47 307.65 1844 . 43 23093 21. 4 0 . 288 421. 15 1844. 43 >rj 
22 GRUMMAN CORP 156 . 43 538 . 19 1073. 32 10376 27 . 6 5.610 206.45 1073 . 32 01--3 
23 HARSCO CORP 274 . 45 165 . 56 701,80 19748 19 . 4 0.000 142. 87 701. 80 ::0 ~ 
24 HESSTON CORP 39.24 8 6 . 89 166.40 3366 6 . 4 1.1 59 7 8 .79 IGG. 40 ~: 25 INTL HARVESTE R CO 1360 . 79 1634. 4 2 5346. 12 32 31 7 7. 1· 21 .646 1608 . 15 5346 . 12 26 . KAY CORP 31 . 02 130 . 55 294 . 40 3617 14 . 4 0 .000 162 . 07 294.40 
2 7 LO EWS CORP 372.0 1 399 . 97 99 14 . 07 12558 89.0 0 . 000 909 . 77 9914 . 07 0 
26 MAGIC CHEF I NC 61. 39 14 2 . 15 366.91 7786 9.0 2 . 860 108 . 22 368. 9 1 ~ 29 MONOGRAM I NDUSTRI ES INC 97 . 84 55.45 242.78 1646 49 . 4 0.297 4 1.30 242.78 
30 MUNFORD INC 46 . 39 4 t . 98 113. 42 2 17 2 10.5 o. 420 39.28 1 13. 42 Ul 
31 NEWMONT MI NING COR P 840.74 24 8 . 34 1932. 82 27028 43. I 0 . 930 227.55 1932.82 t>::I r< 3 2 OLIN CORP 844.93 309.72 16 18.03 2363 1 24.0 o .ooo 376 . 34 16 18 . 0 3 ~ 
33 PACCA R INC . 202 .63 189 . 62 848.01 8245 61.0 0 . 000 205. 40 848 . 0 1 ("') 1-3 34 PARKER DR IL LING CO 507.33 56.6 1 7 43.84 28861 2 1. 1 0. 116 152 . 15 743.8 4 t<:I 
35 RUBBERMAID INC 125 . 83 33.51 237.85 7724 36 , 7 0 . 000 51. 73 237 .85 t:I 
36 SCOVILL INC 146.95 123 . 81 557. 72 9399 18 . 5 o . 182 177 . 09 557 . 7 2 >rj 
37 TELEX CORP 52 . 66 65 . 92 157.64 12634 6 . 4 0.000 30. 29 157 . 6 4 H 
38 TRANSWAY INTERNAT I ONAL CORP 12 1 . 98 32 . 20 326. 56 6 545 23 . 3 0 . 000 86.98 326.56 ~ 39 UNIROYAL I NC 518.01 429.27 1458 .23 26619 6 . 7 4.869 352."67 1458 . 23 Cf) 
40 WEAN UNITED INC 42 . 68 28 . 93 177 . 3:.l 3090 4 . 5 0.600 69.92 177 . 33 
>rj 4 1 WHIRLPOOL CORP 278. 12 256.55 1133.97 36265 25 . 3 0.000 247.67 1133 . 97 0 
42 WI TCO CHEMICAL CORP 28 1 . 94 117 . 2 1 725 . 36 9315 24 . 2 0 . 140 220.67 725.36 ::0 
43 WOOLWORTH (F . W. ) CO 1217.00 1456.00 3142 .oo 30330 18.0 2.20 0 926 . 00 3142.00 I-' 
\D 
00 
0 
".'J 
a. 
SAS 
OBS REP INV REPLANT 
1 40330 89420 
2 8095 18970 
3 4686 8035 
4 12005 44460 
5 49976 68055 
6 51250 120520 
7 30980 32780 
8 19865 11795 
9 59838 63913 
10 57090 63950 
11 482 29351 
12 27200 38700 
13 6100 13200 
14 12258 25203 
15 272 119 706002 
16 24019 35612 
17 84429 185233 
16 13455 32142 
19 1720 9700 
20 2640 66683 
21 51414 109629 
22 42760 27320 
23 21284 33392 
24 11088 2770 
25 201480 186020 
26 18330 1120 I 
27 62422 111614 
28 16654 11201 
29 5778 1375' 
30 3558 10488 
31 23666 130940 
32 46870 108810 
33 35800 23870 
34 6127 68154 
35 4785 16286 
36 20927 29813 
37 6620 5430 
38 3942 15826 
39 43710 94900 
40 4000 8000 
4 I 44524 39907 
42 19526 34510 
43 166900 193400 
RINV RNP 
403.30 894.20 
80.95 189.70 
46 . 86 80 . 35 
120.05 444 . 60 
499.76 680 . 55 
512.50 1205. 20 
309.80 327 . 80 
198 . 65 117 .95 
598.38 639. 13 
570.90 639.50 
4.82 293.51 
272 .00 367.00 
61 . 00 132 .00 
122 . 58 252.03 
2721. 19 7060 . 02 
240. 19 356 . 12 
844.29 1852.33 
134.55 321. 42 
17 . 20 97.00 
26 . 40 666.83 
514 . 14 1096.29 
427.60 273.20 
212.84 333.92 
110.88 27.70 
2014.80 1860.20 
183 . 30 112.01 
624.22 1116. 14 
166.54 112.01 
57.78 137 .51 
35.58 104.88 
238.66 1309. 40 
466.70 1088. 10 
358.00 238. 70 
61. 27 681. 54 
47.85 162.86 
209 . 27 298 . 13 
66 . 20 54.30 
39 . 42 158.26 
437 . 10 949 . 00 
40.00 80.00 
445.24 399.07 
195.26 345. 10 
1669 . 00 1934.00 
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SAS 
OBS COMPANY HNP HINV TA 
ALLIS-CHALMERS CORP 369.23 349.39 1594.25 
2 AMERACE CORP 71. 33 77. 18 214.35 
3 AME RICAN CYANAMID CO 1325.06 535 . 13 3065.02 
4 BAKER INTERNATIONAL CORP 764.30 499.01 1808.54 
s BEKER INDUSTRIES 195.09 43 . 84 3 4 2.93 
6 BORDEN INC 1093.34 400 . 9 2 2508.82 
1 BORG- WARNER CORP 673.20 354.00 219 1 .20 
8 CAPITAL CIT I ES COMMUN I CAT I ON 18 5.63 13 . 74 697.62 
9 CELANESE CORP 1518 . 00 443 . 00 2991.00 
10 CRYSTAL OIL CO 294.20 15.78 409.26 
11 DEERE & CO 1408.34 872.04 5683 . 88 
12 ·01 GIORGIO CORP 6 5 .72 123 .69 3 10.64 
13 DRAVO CORP 296 . 06 103 . 36 719.98 
14 EL PASO CO 251 8 . 03 156 . 69 3568 . 88 
15 FI SHER FOODS INC 72 . 84 4 4 . 43 222 .30 
16 GENERAL REFRACTOR IE S CO 113 . BB 8 I. 9 1 303 . 43 
17 HARSCO CORP 274.45 165 .56 701 . 80 
18 HRT INDUSTRIES INC 89. 3 1 69 . 30 21 1 . 15 
19 LAMSON & SESSIONS CO 63.40 45.47 164. 87 
20 MIDLAND-ROSS CORP 202. 11 210.07 668 . 89 
21 NATIONA L SEMICONDUCTOR CORP 332.08 177.52 7 8 5 . 04 
22 NORTON SIMON INC 499.57 620.77 2382 . 48 
23 PHIBRO SALOMON COR P 488.40 1048. 90 5788.00 
24 QUAKER DA TS CO 633.30 321.60 1454 . 10 
25 REICHHOLD CHE MICALS INC 173. 40 82. 8 2 408.58 
26 SHAKLEE CORP BB . 48 51.33 191 .67 
27 STANLEY WORKS 231. 53 178. 80 666.47 
28 TOYS R US INC 151.20 140 . 66 44 2.50 
29 UNIROYAL I NC 518 . 01 429.27 1458.23 
30 WAL-MAR T STORES 333 .03 490 . 57 937.51 
COMM CSPRJCE 
12565 . 0 15 . 7 
2509 . 0 17 . 0 
47954.0 29.0 
67412 . 9 38 . 0 
1 1819.0 8 . 3 
29298 . 0 28.0 
41697.0 26 . 4 
13025.0 73 . 6 
15608 . 0 55. 7 
20937.0 19 . 4 
67507.9 35.4 
5902.0 9.0 
12930 . 0 16 . 6 
46813 . 0 22 . 7 
54 42.0 13.0 
3798.0 4 . 5 
19748 . 0 19.4 
3470.0 9 . 0 
526 1.0 4.6 
12208.0 17 . 4 
23247 . 0 19 . 1 
39642.0 19.2 
68096.9 26.0 
19153.0 35 . 6 
6915.0 11. 3 
6232.0 23.6 
26508.0 17.4 
20647 . 0 29.5 
26619.0 6.7 
32420.0 42.4 
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PO STDEBT LTDEBT 
8 . 478 577 . 47 1594.25 
1 .439 41. 53 214.35 
0.000 8 33 . 28 3065.02 
0.000 467.55 1808. 54 
0.000 8 7 . 46 342.93 
0.050 588.56 2508.82 
0 . 400 560. 40 2 191. 20 
0 . 000 113. 43 697.62 
4 . 000 586.00 2991 . 0 0 
o .ooo 72.75 409 .26 
0.000 2304.51 5683.88 
0 .957 92.35 310 . 64 
0.396 271 . 38 719.98 
o.ooo 667.75 1586 . 59 
o. 11 1 75.31 222.30 
0. 063 137 . 63 303.43 
0.000 142 . 87 701.80 
0 . 000 5 6 . 13 211.15 
0.000 35. 13 164.87 
0 . 116 222 . 90 668 . 8 9 
0.000 286.90 785. 0 4 
0.94 8 734.74 2382 . 4 8 
0 . 000 3563 . 10 5788. 0 0 
4.600 492 . 80 1454.10 
2.944 8 9.84 408 . 58 
0 . 000 51. 34 191.67 
0.000 169.52 666.47 
0.000 145.39 442.50 
4.889 352.67 1458. 23 
0 . 347 339.96 937.51 
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SAS 
OBS REP INV REPLANT 
1 45200 54500 
2 10220 14520 
3 67700 252700 
4 42478 71915 
5 2877 25304 
6 55376 184857 
7 59730 83890 
8 778 14045 
9 53800 176800 
10 779 12943 
11 187800 186800 
12 12951 12627 
13 12300 44600 
14 16762 177292 
15 9993 25130 
16 11420 23868 
17 21011 29316 
18 4709 13646 
19 10467 20007 
20 15194 22990 
21 15900 23200 
22 61367 100143 
23 250000 44900 
24 38383 95110 
25 12540 29210 
26 4413 9730 
27 26732 27600 
28 9691 11967 
29 19810 106360 
30 27421 21376 
IHNV 
452.00 
102. 20 
677.00 
424.78 
28.77 
553.76 
597.30 
7.78 
538.00 
7.79 
1878.00 
129.51 
123.00 
167.62 
99.93 
114. 20 
210. 11 
47.09 
104. 67 
151. 94 
159.00 
613.67 
2500.00 
383.83 
125.40 
44. 13 
267.32 
96.91 
198. 10 
274.21 
RNP 
545.00 
145.20 
2527 .00 
719. 15 
253.04 
1848.57 
838.90 
140. 45 
1768.00 
129.43 
1868.00 
126.27 
446.00 
1772. 92 
251. 30 
238.68 
293. 16 
136.46 
200.07 
229.90 
232.00 
1001. 43 
449.00 
951. 10 
292. 10 
97.30 
276.00 
119. 67 
1063 .60 
213.76 
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